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Firearm Localism 
abstract.  Second Amendment doctrine is largely becoming a line-drawing exercise, as 
courts try to determine which “Arms” are constitutionally protected, which “people” are 
permitted to keep and bear them, and in which ways those arms and people can be regulated. 
But the developing legal regime has yet to account for one potentially significant set of lines: the 
city limits themselves. In rural areas, gun crime and gun control are relatively rare, and gun 
culture is strong. In cities, by contrast, rates of violent gun crime are comparatively high, and 
opportunities for recreational gun use are scarce. And from colonial Boston to nineteenth-
century Tombstone to contemporary New York City, guns have consistently been regulated 
more heavily in cities—a degree of geographic variation that is hard to find with regard to any 
other constitutional right. This Article argues that Second Amendment doctrine and state 
preemption laws can and should incorporate these longstanding and sensible differences 
between urban and rural gun use and regulation. Doing so would present new possibilities for 
the stalled debate on gun control, protect rural gun culture while permitting cities to address 
urban gun violence, and preserve the longstanding American tradition of firearm localism.  
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introduction 
The image of hardy, frontier-dwelling Americans defending themselves 
and their families with guns has long captured the imaginations of the public, 
scholars, commentators, and at least one very important vote on the Supreme 
Court.1 Though modern urban areas like Chicago and Washington—the cities 
whose handgun bans were struck down in the Supreme Court’s two recent 
Second Amendment decisions2—have arguably strayed from it,3 the vision of 
armed self-defense in frontier towns remains a powerful archetype. The legal 
reality, however, was more complicated. Nineteenth-century visitors to 
supposed gun havens like Dodge City, Kansas, and Tombstone, Arizona, could 
not lawfully bring their firearms past the city limits.4 In fact, the famed 
shootout at Tombstone’s O.K. Corral was sparked in part by Wyatt Earp 
pistol-whipping Tom McLaury for violating Tombstone’s gun control laws.5 
Matters were entirely different outside of town, where guns were both legal 
 
1.  For discussion of the influence of the frontier on American gun culture, see ROBERT J. 
SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 9-12 (1st ed. 1995); B. Bruce-Biggs, The Great 
American Gun War, PUB. INT., Fall 1976, at 37, 61; and Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of 
Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 454–55 (1999). See also WILLIAM R. TONSO, GUN AND 
SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL AND EXISTENTIAL ROOTS OF THE AMERICAN ATTACHMENT TO FIREARMS 
38 (1982) (noting that guns can be “positively or negatively associated with Daniel Boone, 
the Civil War, the elemental lifestyles [of] the frontier,” and other concepts). 
           At oral argument in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Justice Kennedy 
referred to “the right of people living in the wilderness to protect themselves” and the 
“concern of the remote settler to defend himself and his family against hostile Indian tribes 
and outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like that.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 8, 30, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290). 
2.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
3.  See Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed 
Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 24 (1992) (“By many accounts the framers 
envisioned a rural agrarian based America. . . . [W]e can usefully ask whether disarmament 
advocacy is driven by an urban vision that exalts luxury at the expense of individual liberty. 
To the degree it is, it may be in conflict with our core constitutional values.”). 
4.  See ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 13 
(2011); see also DODGE CITY, KAN., CITY ORDINANCES no. 16, § 11 (Sept. 22, 1876) (“[A]ny 
person who shall in the City of Dodge City, carry concealed, or otherwise, about his or her 
person, any pistol, bowie knife, sling shot, or other dangerous or deadly weapon, except United 
States Civil Officers, State, County, Township or City officers shall be fined . . . Seventy-Five 
Dollars.”). 
5.  See WINKLER, supra note 4, at 172-73. 
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and prevalent for self-defense and other purposes.6 The city limits themselves 
thus played an important role in defining the scope of the right to keep and 
bear arms. 
The not-so-wild West is representative in this regard. Indeed, perhaps no 
characteristic of gun control in the United States is as “longstanding”7 as the 
stricter regulation of guns in cities than in rural areas. In the Founding era, 
many cities—Philadelphia, New York, and Boston prominent among them—
regulated or prohibited the firing of weapons and storage of gunpowder within 
city limits,8 even while the possession and use of guns and gunpowder were 
permitted in rural areas. That geographic tailoring has remained largely 
consistent in the two centuries since, and it is no accident that District of 
Columbia v. Heller9 and McDonald v. City of Chicago10 both involved municipal 
gun regulation. 
This Article argues that future Second Amendment cases can and should 
incorporate the longstanding and sensible differences regarding guns and gun 
control in rural and urban areas, giving more protection to gun rights in rural 
areas and more leeway to gun regulation in cities. Part I describes the 
significant differences between urban and rural areas with regard to the 
prevalence, regulation, perceived importance, use, and misuse of guns. Violent 
gun crime and support for gun control are heavily concentrated in cities, while 
opposition to gun control is strongest in rural areas, where the costs of gun 
 
6.  See id. at 165 (citing ROBERT R. DYKSTRA, THE CATTLE TOWNS (1968)); see also Heller, 554 
U.S. at 715 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Two hundred years ago, most Americans, many living 
on the frontier, would likely have thought of self-defense primarily in terms of outbreaks of 
fighting with Indian tribes, rebellions such as Shays’ Rebellion, marauders, and crime-
related dangers to travelers on the roads, on footpaths, or along waterways.”). 
7.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or 
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”). 
8.  See infra notes 165–172 and accompanying text; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 683-85 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City, the three largest cities in America 
during that period, all restricted the firing of guns within city limits to at least some degree. 
. . . Furthermore, several towns and cities (including Philadelphia, New York, and Boston) 
regulated, for fire-safety reasons, the storage of gunpowder, a necessary component of an 
operational firearm.”); LEE KENNETT & JAMES LAVERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: 
THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA 48 (1975) (“[D]uring the colonial period, the urban 
areas were relatively free of the consistent use of firearms.”). 
9.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
10.  130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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crime are lowest. Rural residents are far more likely to own firearms than 
people living in cities, and have more opportunities to use them for lawful 
activities like hunting and recreational shooting. These differences, while 
certainly not universal—not every city has stringent gun control,11 nor do all 
rural residents oppose it—are so stable and well-recognized that they have 
calcified into what are often referred to as different gun “cultures.”12 
But while this cultural divide is well-established and long-standing, it 
rarely figures prominently in discussions of constitutional doctrine, and rarer 
still is it seen as an opportunity rather than an obstacle. This is unfortunate and 
unnecessary, because Second Amendment doctrine already contains the tools 
with which to achieve geographic tailoring. Heller and McDonald left the 
contours of Second Amendment doctrine fuzzy, aside from approving a set of 
“presumptively lawful” gun control measures.13 The opinions did, however, 
suggest two major jurisprudential alternatives: one rooted in historical 
analysis, the other in interest balancing.14 Part II shows how either road can 
lead to a locally tailored Second Amendment.15 
 
11.  As explained in more detail below, a simple headcount of existing municipal gun control 
laws is likely to underrepresent support for urban gun control, since state preemption laws 
make it difficult or impossible for many cities to regulate guns as they might otherwise 
choose to do. See infra Section III.B. 
12.  See, e.g., WINKLER, supra note 4, at 14 (“The debate over guns is usually portrayed as a 
cultural battle between urban and rural, with the latter seeing guns as part of their cultural 
heritage of hunting.”); Dan M. Kahan, The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory Manifesto, 
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 4-5 (2003); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less 
Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2003); 
David Brooks & Gail Collins, What We Talk About When We Talk About Guns, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR (July 25, 2012, 1:22 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/25 
/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-guns (David Brooks: “The gun control debate is 
no longer about guns. It’s a culture war between urbanites and rural people.”). 
          For a detailed argument that the “individual” Second Amendment right is largely the 
product of a socio-cultural movement, see Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as 
Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). 
13.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26. 
14.  See generally Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment 
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009) (describing categorical and balancing approaches). 
15.  This is not an Article about what was long the central battle in Second Amendment law and 
scholarship—whether the Amendment protects only militias, or instead protects an 
“individual” right to gun ownership for non-militia-related purposes. As a matter of 
constitutional law, Heller and McDonald settled that question, coming down squarely on the 
side of an “individual” right whose “core” and “central component” is self-defense. But 
translating that principle into constitutional doctrine requires another step. See Richard H. 
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First, the majorities in Heller and McDonald endorsed a historical-
categorical approach that evaluates contemporary gun control measures based 
on whether they have “longstanding” historical analogues.16 This approach is 
categorical in that it eschews interest-balancing, focusing on line-drawing 
rather than cost-benefit analysis.17 Lower courts applying it have looked not 
just to Founding-era regulations, but to the broad sweep of gun control 
throughout American history.18 Under this historical-categorical approach, the 
fact that the United States has a deeply rooted tradition of comparatively 
stringent urban gun control is an argument for treating contemporary urban 
gun control as, if not “presumptively lawful,”19 at least meriting special 
deference. As noted above and described in more detail below,20 cities have 
traditionally enacted the country’s strictest gun control measures, including 
handgun bans, safe storage requirements, limits on public carrying, and 
prohibitions on shooting guns within city limits. To be sure, the historical 
record is neither complete nor uniform. But it appears to be at least as 
persuasive as the evidence supporting other Second Amendment rules 
specifically approved by the Court in Heller—the ban on felons in possession, 
for example.21 
 
Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 54, 56-57 (1997). That is the project I pursue here. 
16.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
17.  See Blocher, supra note 14, at 405-11. 
18.  In the context of municipal gun control, there are especially good reasons to avoid a narrow 
focus on the Founding era, since technically it was the Fourteenth Amendment that made 
the Second applicable against states and cities. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 
(7th Cir. 2011) (arguing that for state and local laws, “the focus of the original-meaning 
inquiry is carried forward” to the Reconstruction era). 
19.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
20.  See infra Section I.B. 
21.  See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047-49 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., 
concurring) (questioning whether felon-in-possession rules are “longstanding”); Carlton 
F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial 
Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1374-76 (2009) (same); Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s 
Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 731-32 
(2012) (“Although Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller characterized disarming felons as a long-
standing tradition, federal law did not disqualify any felons from possessing firearms until 
1938 and did not disqualify nonviolent felons until 1961.”). 
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Judges and scholars have questioned the wisdom and coherence of the 
historical-categorical approach,22 and many lower courts seem to have shelved 
it in favor of the pragmatic balancing described by Justice Breyer in his Heller 
dissent.23 The latter, which has much in common with the standards of 
scrutiny found in other areas of constitutional law, evaluates the 
constitutionality of gun control laws based on the strength of the governmental 
and private interests involved and the degree to which a given law serves the 
former while protecting the latter.24 Here, too, the case for local tailoring of 
Second Amendment analysis is straightforward, for the simple reason that 
cities and rural areas generally have different gun-related interests and face 
different gun-related challenges.25 
Part III broadens the frame by showing how ongoing debates about the 
general virtues of constitutional localism are relevant to firearm localism and 
vice versa. Some constitutional rights are already locally tailored,26 and a 
growing number of scholars have explored and celebrated the role of localism 
in constitutional law.27 Of course, the question of whether any particular right 
should be locally tailored is ultimately a specific and normative one,28 which is 
 
22.  See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (concluding 
that it would be “weird” if a gun control law were to become constitutional simply as a 
function of its age); Blocher, supra note 14, at 413 (“[T]he majority’s attempt to create 
categories neither reflects nor enables a coherent account of the Second Amendment’s core 
values, whatever they may be.”); Civil Rights: The Heller Case: Minutes from a Convention of 
The Federalist Society, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 293, 301-05 (2009) (remarks of Prof. Nelson 
R. Lund, George Mason University School of Law). 
23.  See Rostron, supra note 21, at 706-07, 756-57 (describing the use of a balancing approach in 
federal courts after Heller and McDonald); see also Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second 
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 715-26 (2007) (describing the “reasonable regulation 
standard” used by state courts evaluating gun control under state constitutional provisions). 
24.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 689-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing a test that would “ask[] 
whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of 
proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests”). 
25.  See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text. 
26.  See infra Section III.A. 
27.  See, e.g., David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, 
115 YALE L.J. 2218 (2006); Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical 
Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1133 
(1999) [hereinafter Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution]; Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly 
Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005) 
[hereinafter Rosen, Tailoring]; Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and 
Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004). 
28.  See, e.g., Rosen, Tailoring, supra note 27, at 1516-17; Schragger, supra note 27, at 1818. 
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why the argument for firearm localism is built on a foundation of geographic 
tailoring that is unique to gun rights and gun control. But the broader case for 
constitutional localism confirms that this would not mean treating the Second 
Amendment as some kind of second-class right. 
Section III.B shows how localism arguments would impact not only federal 
constitutional doctrine, but also state law. Over the past few decades, most 
states—acting largely in response to local-level handgun bans29—have passed 
laws forbidding or simply limiting municipal gun control.30 These preemption 
laws do not reach all cities, nor do they forbid all gun control, so a localized 
Second Amendment would have significant reach even under current law. But 
many of the arguments for Second Amendment localism also suggest that 
broad preemption laws are an undesirable break from historical practice. 
Especially in the wake of Heller and McDonald, which constitutionally 
guarantee the rights that preemption laws purport to protect, the laws 
themselves can and should be modified or repealed. 
Of course, there are various objections, some of them quite strong, to the 
idea of firearm localism. One might argue that increased deference to urban 
gun control would undermine the self-defense rights of people living in high-
crime inner cities. Or perhaps instead of achieving too much, firearm localism 
would be crippled from the start by the practical difficulty of defining urban 
and rural areas. Section III.C attempts to answer these and other objections. 
Other potential questions and objections can be answered preemptively by 
clarifying what this Article does not argue. Firearm localism would not exempt 
cities from the Second Amendment, nor would it permit evisceration of the 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. It would instead mean giving 
cities extra leeway with regard to matters like the regulation of assault weapons 
or concealed carrying. Conversely, firearm localism is not an argument against 
all state or national gun control. As with any other issue, there are some 
matters that cannot be regulated effectively at the local level31—manufacturing 
 
29.  KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 162-
65 (2006); see also GLENN H. UTTER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS 201 
(2000). 
30.  See infra Section III.B. 
31.  See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory 
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010) (arguing that the federal powers 
enumerated in Article I, Section 8 should be understood in light of collective action 
problems among the states); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental 
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2346 (1996) (arguing that interstate spillover effects 
can justify federal regulation). 
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requirements, for example—and others that can, such as public carrying rules 
that can be enforced on the spot by local police. 
The Article concludes by showing how firearm localism might address 
ongoing Second Amendment debates regarding the regulation of assault 
weapons and concealed carrying. With regard to the former, Heller holds that 
the “Arms” protected by the Amendment are those in common use, but does 
not explain how to separate protected arms from proscribable “dangerous and 
unusual weapons.”32 Firearm localism would rely on local standards to make 
that distinction, just as First Amendment doctrine does when separating 
obscenity from protected speech.33 It would also justify increased deference for 
urban prohibitions of concealed carrying—such laws have long been accepted 
as constitutional,34 and have a special claim on constitutionality in cities.35 
Either of these specific forms of tailoring would help preserve the firearm 
localism that has always been a part of our legal tradition. 
i .   america’s two gun cultures 
Though sizeable majorities of Americans agree on certain basic precepts 
about the Second Amendment—that it protects an “individual” right to bear 
arms36 but permits reasonable gun control laws,37 which should be more 
 
32.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008); see Eugene Volokh, Implementing 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research 
Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1480-81 (2009) (describing “[t]he difficulty with a 
‘dangerous and unusual weapons’ test”). 
33.  See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974). To be clear, not every element of 
the constitutional test for obscenity is locally tailored—a jury must also determine “whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). That inquiry is not conducted through the lens of 
community standards. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987). An analogous inquiry in 
Second Amendment doctrine might ask whether a weapon, even though uncommon, has 
serious value for self-defense. 
34.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[T]he majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the 
question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the 
Second Amendment or state analogues.”). 
35.  See infra notes 328-342 and accompanying text. 
36.  See Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own Guns, GALLUP, Mar. 27, 
2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/Public-Believes-Americans-Right-OwnGuns.aspx. 
37.  Matthew Bennett, Misfire: How the Debate over Gun Rights Ignores Reality, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. 
REV. 482, 488 (2008) (“Americans not only believe in Second Amendment rights, they 
support strong gun laws.”); Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Fact-Free Gun Policy?, 151 U. PA. 
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strictly enforced38—“pro-gun” and “pro-gun control” beliefs are not evenly 
distributed throughout the country. Scholars and commentators have long 
recognized this, often describing the gun control debate as being between the 
South and the rest of the nation,39 between “cosmopolitan” and “bedrock” 
America,40 or between a “primary” gun culture that includes the South, West, 
and Midwest and a “secondary” gun culture in coastal, urbanized states and 
cities.41 
These line-drawing efforts capture important characteristics, but perhaps 
the most consistent underlying differences are those between urban and rural 
gun cultures.42 Americans in cities are, and apparently always have been, less 
likely to own, use, or approve of guns than those in rural areas. City-dwellers 
are victimized by gun crime at much higher rates, and are far more likely to 
support stringent gun control. Rural residents, by contrast, are more likely to 
grow up with guns, to have positive role models with regard to their 
responsible use, and to oppose gun control. These differences are historically 
consistent, and they tend to be obscured by doctrinal analysis that focuses 
 
L. REV. 1329, 1330-37 (2003) (reporting that at least three-quarters of respondents in a 
national survey supported registration and child proofing of all handguns, background 
check requirements for private gun sales, and denial of guns to those convicted of domestic 
violence misdemeanors). 
38.  See Washington Post-ABC News Poll, WASH. POST (Jan. 13-16, 2011), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_01172011.html (reporting that 
nearly twice as many respondents (57% vs. 29%) believed stricter enforcement of existing 
laws would more effectively reduce gun violence than would passing new laws). 
39.  Erik Luna, The .22 Caliber Rorschach Test, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 79-81 (2002). 
40.  William R. Tonso, Social Science and Sagecraft in the Debate over Gun Control, 5 LAW & POL’Y 
Q. 325, 330-31 (1983); see also KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 254-56 (contrasting 
“cosmopolitan” urban and “shirtsleeve” rural views on guns). 
41.  Michael P. O’Shea, Federalism and the Implementation of the Right to Arms, 59 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 201, 209-13 (2008). 
42.  See SPITZER, supra note 1, at 13 (“Those who compose and support the active gun culture are 
overwhelmingly white males, live in rural areas (especially in the South), are likely to be 
Protestant, and are from ‘old stock’ . . . . Conversely, those for whom the gun culture carries 
the least appeal are likely to be females, from larger metropolitan areas, from the Northeast 
and from more recent immigrant descent.”); Luna, supra note 39, at 81 (“A final geographic 
phenomenon of the pro-gun culture cuts across both the South and the West: rural, small-
town America. In the United States, inhabitants of countryside regions are more likely to 
own firearms and oppose gun control laws.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Putting the Gun Control 
Debate in Social Perspective, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 477 (2004). 
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solely on states and the federal government.43 Taking urban-rural differences 
into account would have a significant impact, even if “urban” is narrowly 
defined. As Carl Bogus notes, the fifty metropolitan statistical areas with one 
million or more people “comprise only a small fraction of the nation’s land 
mass but include about 58% of the nation’s population.”44 They also suffer a 
disproportionate amount of the nation’s gun violence.45 
It is worth noting that scholarship in this area is rife with disagreement 
over basic empirical facts—whether defensive gun uses average 2.5 million per 
year46 or 80,000,47 for example, or whether more guns lead to more or less 
 
43.  Michael O’Shea makes a thoughtful and convincing argument for constitutional deference 
to state regulations, but disclaims the urban/rural divide, arguing that “when efforts are 
made to paint the conflict over guns as urban versus rural, it is useful to recall that the 
contemporary legal landscape differs greatly from this stereotype.” O’Shea, supra note 41, at 
212; see also id. at 209 (“The major divide on guns is no longer between the rural South and 
the rest of the nation. Instead it is between several highly urbanized coastal states and cities, 
whose gun laws reflect a common denominator I call the secondary gun culture, and the rest 
of the nation—Midwest, South, and West—whose laws reflect America’s primary gun 
culture.”). 
          In part because my goal is to show how the cultures can coexist, I make no effort here to 
code urban or rural gun culture as “primary.” My major point of departure from O’Shea is 
with regard to treating states as the sole unit of analysis. O’Shea argues: 
[T]he smallest appropriate geographic unit for firearms policy (and for most 
culturally divisive issues) is not the city or county, but the state—because that is 
the minimum geographic unit for living a balanced life. Rural and exurban 
residents need cities to visit. Urbanites need to escape to quieter areas. 
  Id. at 212. Though I fully agree that a mix of urban and rural experience helps one lead a 
“balanced life,” I cannot see how the Constitution compels as much, nor even how that 
principle supports O’Shea’s conclusion. If a mixture of urban and rural life is important, 
then doctrine should focus on that balance, not on state borders, which were not drawn to 
balance cities and “quieter areas” and do a bad job of it in any event. 
44.  Carl T. Bogus, Gun Control and America’s Cities: Public Policy and Politics, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. 
REV. 440, 463 (2008); see also LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, REGULATING GUNS IN 
AMERICA: AN EVALUATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE AND SELECTED 
LOCAL GUN LAWS (2008) [hereinafter REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA] (reviewing local gun 
laws in Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, Hartford, Los Angeles, Newark, New York, 
Omaha, and San Francisco, cities “in states that presently provide local jurisdictions broad 
authority to regulate firearms”). 
45.  See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
46.  Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-
Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 184 tbl.2 (1995) (basing figures on 
phone survey designed by authors). 
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crime.48 Scandals involving flawed historical research49 or survey results that 
could not be replicated50 cast clouds over even the most seemingly robust 
findings, and tend to entrench each side’s belief that the other is playing fast 
and loose with the facts. The goal of this discussion is simply to show that 
Americans are deeply divided about guns and gun control—a proposition that 
few would dispute—and that this division tracks the urban/rural line. The aim 
is not to prove that all rural areas or residents are part of the gun culture, nor 
that all cities and urban dwellers reject it. Rather, it is to show that the 
differences between urban and rural gun cultures are real, and should influence 
our evaluation of the constitutionality of gun control. 
A.  Rural Gun Culture 
America’s gun culture generally celebrates the ownership, possession, and 
use of firearms,51 and is skeptical of gun control.52 It is “predominantly rural 
and small town,” just as “its enemies are predominantly urban.”53 
 
47.  MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS AND CRIME: HANDGUN VICTIMIZATION, 
FIREARM SELF-DEFENSE, AND FIREARM THEFT 1-2 (1994) (basing figures on the National 
Crime Victimization Survey). 
48.  Compare JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-
CONTROL LAWS (3d ed. 2010), with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the 
“More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003). 
49.  See generally James Lindgren, Fall from Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 
YALE L.J. 2195 (2002) (reviewing Michael Bellesiles’ Arming America (2000), and identifying 
numerous errors and apparent falsifications in the book’s historical analysis). 
50.  See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST 
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 133 (rev. ed. 2010) (recounting “the troubling 
allegation that Lott actually invented some of the survey data that support his more-
guns/less-crime theory” and reporting that “[w]hen other scholars have tried to replicate his 
results, they found that right-to-carry laws simply don’t bring down crime.”). Cf. Lott v. 
Levitt, 556 F.3d 564, 566-67 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding dismissal of a defamation claim 
brought by John Lott against Steven Levitt on the basis of this passage). 
51.  See DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA 
ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 419-22 (1992); Richard Hofstadter, 
America as a Gun Culture, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1970, at 84; Luna, supra note 39, at 82-85; 
Eric Primm et al., Race, Fear, and Firearms: The Roles of Demographics and Guilt Assuagement 
in the Creation of a Political Partition, 13 J. AFR. AM. STUD. 63, 65 (2009). 
52.  This is not to say that the gun culture unanimously opposes gun control; surveys have 
consistently found that large majorities of Americans—necessarily including some members 
of the gun culture—support reasonable gun control and the enforcement of existing gun 
laws. See sources cited supra notes 37-38; see also Susan Saulny, For Some, Owning Guns 
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Perhaps the most basic element of rural gun culture is, naturally enough, 
the prevalence of guns. Study after study has shown that “[g]un ownership is 
more common among those residing in small cities and towns and in the 
suburbs compared to those living in large cities.”54 The precise figures vary, but 
one representative survey found that “[o]nly 29% of urban residents own a gun 
while 56% of rural residents do so.”55 This difference is noticeable even at the 
state and regional level, as households in states that are themselves more 
rural—primarily those in the South and West—are more likely than those in 
the Northeast to have guns.56 The General Social Survey found that only 23% 
of urban households had guns in the 2000s, compared to 56% in rural areas; 
the same study found that 22% of households in the Northeast had guns, 
compared to roughly 40% in the comparatively rural South and mountain 
regions.57 Other studies have found similar figures.58 This “strong regional 
 
Doesn’t Necessarily Mean Liking Them, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/us/gun-owners-arent-always-gun-lovers.html (noting views 
of gun owners who “express[] support for stricter gun control legislation”). 
53.  DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 170 (2003); see also id. at 175 (“[T]he 
gun culture has a core constituency—white, rural males with conservative values, especially 
in the South.”). 
54.  Jan E. Dizard et al., The War over Guns: Introduction: Numbers Don’t Count, in GUNS IN 
AMERICA: A READER 165, 169 (Jan E. Dizard et al. eds., 1999); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 
53, at 71 (“American gun owners . . . reside primarily in rural areas . . . .”). 
55.  Bogus, supra note 44, at 464 (citing THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2005, at 141 (Alec M. 
Gallup & Frank Newport eds., 2006)); see also Gary Langer, Some Gun Measures Broadly 
Backed but the Politics Show an Even Split, Mar. 12, 2013, http:// 
www.langerresearch.com/uploads/1147a2GunControl.pdf (reporting that gun ownership is 
“nearly doubly common in rural compared with urban areas”); Chuck Raasch, In Gun 
Debate, It’s Urban vs. Rural, USA TODAY, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com 
/story/news/nation/2013/02/27/guns-ingrained-in-rural-existence/1949479 (“A compilation 
of December [2012] Gallup polls showed that rural Americans—roughly one-sixth of the 
population—are more than twice as likely to have a gun in the home than those living in 
large cities.”). 
56.  See, e.g., Deborah Azrael et al., State and Local Prevalence of Firearms Ownership Measurement, 
Structure, and Trends, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 43, 52 (2004) (“The percent of the 
state’s population that was rural in 1950 is highly correlated (across states) with household 
gun ownership over four decades later . . . .”). 
57.  Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Share of Homes with Guns Shows 4-Decade Decline, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/us/rate-of-gun-ownership 
-is-down-survey-shows.html. 
58.  A 2008 poll of voters found that only 30% of urban residents own guns, compared to 60% 
in rural areas; the same poll found 32% gun ownership in the East but 47% in the 
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pattern” of gun ownership “has been quite stable over time, suggesting that the 
determinants of gun prevalence have more to do with tradition, culture and 
childhood experience than with concern about crime or other relatively volatile 
matters.”59 In fact, until quite recently, recreation—including hunting, which is 
a predominantly rural pursuit—was the single most common reason for gun 
ownership in the United States.60 It is no surprise, then, that gun ownership is 
highest among people who self-identify as hunters, nor is it surprising that 
they are likelier to own rifles and shotguns than handguns.61 
Perhaps even more important than the simple instrumental point that one 
must have guns in order to hunt things with them is the fact that for members 
of the gun culture, “guns symbolize a cluster of positive values, from physical 
prowess and martial virtue to honor to individual self-sufficiency.”62 As Justice 
Antonin Scalia himself has put it, “The hunting culture, of course, begins with 
a culture that does not have a hostile attitude toward firearms. . . . The attitude 
of people associating guns with nothing but crime, that is what has to be 
changed.”63 The Justice’s argument and his repeated invocation of “culture” 
 
comparatively rural South. Nate Silver, Party Identity in a Gun Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES: 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 18, 2012, 12:39 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012 
/12/18/in-gun-ownership-statistics-partisan-divide-is-sharp. 
59.  Azrael et al., supra note 56, at 52; see Anthony A. Braga et al., The Illegal Supply of Firearms, 
29 CRIME & JUST. 319, 325 (2002) (noting that geographic differences in ownership are 
“remarkably stable over time”). A 1998 survey similarly found 25% gun ownership in the 
Northeast and 60% in the East South Central Census area, which consists of Alabama, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee. Azrael et al., supra note 56, at 43. A 1992 Times/CBS 
News poll reported that only 31% of urban residents own guns, compared to 72% in rural 
areas. SPITZER, supra note 1, at 69. The same poll found 41% gun ownership in the 
Northeast, but 65% in the comparatively rural South. Id. 
60.  Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: National Survey on Private Ownership and Use 
of Firearms, NAT’L INST. JUST. 2-3, 11 (1997), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf. 
61.  Id. at 2-3 (noting that “recreation” is the most common reason for gun ownership); SPITZER, 
supra note 1, at 75 (“By far the most common reasons for gun ownership are hunting and 
related recreational uses, a fact consistent with the prevalence of long guns over 
handguns.”). 
62.  Kahan, supra note 12, at 5; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 53, at 153 (“The gun culture has 
embraced guns not just as a tool but as a central symbol of its whole set of cultural values.”). 
63.  JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 346 (2009); see also David B. Kopel, America’s Only Realistic 
Option: Promoting Responsible Gun Ownership, in GUNS IN AMERICA: A READER, supra note 54, 
at 452, 455 (“New York City would be better off if it had laws like modern Dodge City, 
Kansas, where guns may be readily purchased and used for sports and self-protection—
where, perhaps partly as a result, young people are exposed to models of responsible gun 
ownership.”). 
 the yale law journal 123:82   2013  
96 
 
drive home the point that the issue is not simply what guns do, but also what 
they symbolize. Other accounts of gun culture have the same emphasis: 
The values of this culture are best typified as rural rather than urban: 
they emphasize independence, self-sufficiency, mastery over nature, 
closeness to the land, and so on. Within this culture, the ownership and 
use of firearms are both normal and normatively prescribed, and 
training in the operation and use of small arms is very much a part of 
what fathers are expected to provide to their sons—in short, this 
training is part and parcel of coming of age.64 
For members of the gun culture, “the possession, handling, and use of guns are 
a central part of life”; they “read books and magazines about firearms and 
socialize with kindred spirits in gun clubs and gun stores.”65 
One might argue that this gun culture is flatly irrelevant to the 
interpretation of the Second Amendment, at least to the degree that it is rooted 
in recreational pursuits like hunting that are penumbral to the self-defense 
right recognized in Heller.66 If the core interests of the gun culture are not 
constitutionally salient, then there is little reason to use them as a guide for 
interpreting the Second Amendment, and the frequent invocation of hunting in 
connection with the right to keep and bear arms should be treated as nothing 
more than empty rhetoric.67 
 
64.  JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 113 
(1983); see also Roberta Rampton, Obama Says Rural Voices Need to Be Heard in Gun Debate: 
Report, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/27/us-obama-guns 
-idUSBRE90Q0BA20130127 (“If you grew up and your dad gave you a hunting rifle when 
you were 10, and you went out and spent the day with him and your uncles, and that 
became part of your family’s traditions, you can see why you’d be pretty protective of that.” 
(quoting President Obama)). 
65.  Bruce-Biggs, supra note 1, at 41. 
66.  WINKLER, supra note 4, at 14 (“Self-defense, not hunting, is at the core of the right to bear 
arms . . . .”). 
67.  See, e.g., Transcript: The Republican Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2008), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/24/us/politics/24text-debate.html (“I do support the right of 
individuals to bear arms, whether for hunting purposes or for protection purposes or any 
other reasons. That’s the right that people have.” (quoting Mitt Romney)); Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President at the National Urban League Convention, WHITE HOUSE (July 25, 
2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/25/remarks-president-national 
-urban-league-convention (“I, like most Americans, believe that the Second Amendment 
guarantees an individual the right to bear arms. And we recognize the traditions of gun 
 
 firearm localism 
97 
 
Although historically speaking self-defense might not be as central to rural 
gun culture as hunting,68 it represents an increasingly common—and perhaps 
now predominant69—reason for gun ownership. This might largely be due to 
the decreasing popularity of hunting,70 but it is also easy to see how armed self-
defense could have particular value to rural residents who cannot count on 
speedy responses from police.71 As Erik Luna notes, “There are . . . 
instrumental reasons for pastoral gun ownership, including . . . the need for 
rural citizens to supplement diffuse law enforcement agencies.”72 
The prevalence of guns in rural areas also correlates with certain costs, one 
of which is a higher rate of accidental shootings and suicides,73 including those 
involving children.74 Nevertheless, opposition to gun control remains relatively 
strong in rural areas.75 One recent study found that while 56% of urban 
 
ownership that passed on from generation to generation—that hunting and shooting are 
part of a cherished national heritage.”). 
68.  See Alan J. Lizotte et al., Firearms Ownership for Sport and Protection: Two Not So Divergent 
Models, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 499, 499-500 (1981) (finding a “sporting gun culture” but “only 
partial evidence of a subculture of protective gun ownership”). 
69.  Why Own a Gun? Protection Is Now Top Reason, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND 
THE PRESS, Mar. 12, 2013, http://www.people-press.org/2013/03/12/why-own-a-gun 
-protection-is-now-top-reason. 
70.  Tavernise & Gebeloff, supra note 57 (“According to an analysis of the [2012 General Social 
Survey], only a quarter of men in 2012 said they hunted, compared with about 40 percent 
when the question was asked in 1977.”). 
71.  Raasch, supra note 55 (“‘I live 15 miles from the nearest town or police station,’ says [Frank] 
Jezioro, [West Virginia’s] director of the Division of Natural Resources. ‘My family, my 
wife, my grandkids are there all the time. A home invasion—what good does it do me to call 
911 and wait for someone to come and help me?’”). 
72.  Luna, supra note 39, at 82. 
73.  Lee T. Dresang, Gun Deaths in Rural and Urban Settings: Recommendations for Prevention, 14 
J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 107, 108 (2001) (“Just as regionally comparative studies suggest 
that firearm homicides are more of an urban problem, they generally show that firearm-
related suicides and accidents are a bigger problem in rural areas.”); D.L. Nordstrom et al., 
Rural Population Survey of Behavioral and Demographic Risk Factors for Loaded Firearms, 7 INJ. 
PREVENTION 112, 112 (2001) (“Firearm unintentional and suicide death rates are raised in 
rural places, where one quarter of Americans live.” (citation omitted)). 
74.  See Michael L. Nance et al., Variation in Pediatric and Adolescent Firearm Mortality Rates in 
Rural and Urban U.S. Counties, 125 PEDIATRICS 1112 (2010); James E. Svenson et al., Pediatric 
Firearm-Related Fatalities: Not Just an Urban Problem, 150 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & 
ADOLESCENT MED. 583 (1996). 
75.  Helen A. Moore & Hugh P. Whitt, Multiple Dimensions of the Moral Majority Platform: 
Shifting Interest Group Coalitions, 27 SOC. Q. 423, 434 (1986); Tom W. Smith, The 75% 
Solution: An Analysis of the Structure of Attitudes on Gun Control, 1959-1977, 71 J. CRIM. L. & 
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residents favored stricter gun control, only 34% of rural residents did—
numbers roughly comparable to those for non-gun owners (59%) and gun 
owners (31%).76 One might think that hunters would be more willing to part 
with their guns than those who own them solely for self-protection,77 but some 
evidence suggests that just the opposite is true.78 The best explanation for this 
might simply be that, as Gary Kleck puts it, “hunters are likely to be a part of a 
gun subculture, which would imply being raised in a gun-owning family, 
associating with other gun owners, engaging in valued gun-related recreational 
activities including target shooting as well as hunting, and being exposed to 
more anticontrol rhetoric.”79 In other words, they are more likely to be 
members of a robust gun culture. 
B.  Urban Gun Control Culture 
Just as gun culture is disproportionately prevalent in rural areas, urban 
areas disproportionately have what might be called a gun control culture. City-
dwellers are roughly half as likely as rural residents to own guns,80 and are far 
 
CRIMINOLOGY 300, 303 (1980); THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, IN GUN DEBATE, SEVERAL 
OPTIONS DRAW MAJORITY SUPPORT 10 (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy 
-pdf/01-14-13%20Gun%20Policy%20Release.pdf (finding that 60% of rural residents said it 
was more important to protect gun rights, while only 37% said it was more important to 
control ownership; for urban residents the figures were nearly the inverse: 37% and 57%); 
CNN/ORC Poll, CNN & ORC INT’L 41 (Mar. 18, 2013), http://i2.cdn.turner.com 
/cnn/2013/images/03/18/rel3a.pdf (finding that 72% of rural residents believe there should 
be either “no restrictions” or “minor restrictions” on guns, while only 46% of urban 
residents endorsed those positions). 
76.  Public Opinion on Gun Control Laws (Feb. 2013), TEX. POL., http://laits.utexas.edu/txp_media 
/html/poll/features/gun_control_feature/slide1.html (dataset and methodology described at 
Sampling and Weighting Methodology for the February 2013 Texas Statewide Study, TEX. POL., 
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/11_9_16.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2013)). 
77.  WINKLER, supra note 4, at 14 (“If it’s hard to persuade a hunter to give up the rifle his father 
gave him for his twelfth birthday, imagine the difficulty of persuading a person to disarm 
when he thinks his very life is at stake.”). 
78.  Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun Control: A Multilevel 
Application of the General Social Surveys, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 387, 397 (1996) (“[G]un 
owners who hunted were even more likely to oppose gun control than owners who did not 
hunt.”). 
79.  Id. at 397-98. 
80.  See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
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more likely to support gun control.81 Kristin Goss writes that “[g]un control 
sentiment has always been strongest in urban areas,”82 and Kleck similarly 
concludes that “research has . . . found gun control support stronger among 
city dwellers and suburbanites.”83 This support manifests itself among some of 
the strongest and most forceful advocates for gun control—urban police 
chiefs84 and mayors.85 And it cannot be explained by regional differences, for 
the urban/rural divide is noticeable even within states.86 
It is no surprise, then, that the vast majority of gun control regulations in 
the United States are local,87 and are tailored to the particular risks of gun use 
 
81.  Kahan & Braman, supra note 12, at 1300; see also SPITZER, supra note 1, at 120 (“[G]un 
ownership and opposition to gun controls are closely related.”). 
82.  Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the Great American 
Gun War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 705 (2004). 
83.  Kleck, supra note 78, at 401 (citing Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Gun Control, 36 PUB. OPINION 
Q. 455 (1972)); Smith, supra note 75, at 303. 
84.  WINKLER, supra note 4, at 80-81 (noting that “police chiefs [have been] among the strong 
supporters of reasonable gun control,” and that since the NRA has attacked those who 
advocate for such controls, most established police organizations have broken ties with the 
NRA). Notably, some sheriffs in rural areas have taken the opposite position. Dan Frosch, 
Some Sheriffs Object to Call for Tougher Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/us/some-sheriffs-object-to-call-for-tougher-gun 
-laws.html (noting that dozens of sheriffs have publicly opposed calls for stiffer gun laws, 
and that “[t]heir jurisdictions largely include rural areas, and stand in sharp contrast to 
those of urban police chiefs, who have historically supported tougher gun regulations”). 
85.  UTTER, supra note 29, at 308-09 (noting that the United States Conference of Mayors has 
consistently advocated gun control); see also David Hinson, Pressure Points: How a 
Combination of Methods Employed to Reduce Urban Firearm Crime Threatens the 4th Amendment 
and Proposed Solutions, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) (discussing the genesis of the 
Mayors Against Illegal Guns coalition); MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, http:// 
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
86.  See, e.g., Clinton Tops Florida Favorite Sons in 2016 Race, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds 91% 
Back Universal Gun Background Checks, QUINNIPIAC U. POLL 5 (Mar. 21, 2013), http:// 
www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/fl/fl03212013.pdf (reporting poll results from Florida 
in which 55% of urban respondents favored stricter gun control in the state, as compared to 
only 38% of rural respondents); Michael Virtanen, Poll Shows New York Regions Divided over 
Gun Control Regulations, SARATOGIAN, Feb. 4, 2013, http://www.saratogian.com/articles 
/2013/02/04/news/doc511010e34ebb8914755213.txt (finding that 82% of New York City 
residents support the state’s new gun control law, while only half of upstate residents do). 
87.  SPITZER, supra note 1, at 181 (“America’s 20,000 gun regulations belie the central, often 
ignored fact that nearly all these regulations exist at the state and local levels.”); Jon S. 
Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun Laws: Trends for 1970-99, in EVALUATING 
GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 345, 363 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 
2003) [hereinafter EVALUATING GUN POLICY] (“The key to the 20,000 calculation, therefore, 
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in densely populated areas. Common categories of municipal regulations are 
those governing classes of weapons,88 sales and transfers,89 gun dealers and 
other sellers,90 gun ownership,91 and consumer and child safety.92 Permit 
requirements are also relatively common, and can be very restrictive.93 Of 
course, such restrictions are not uniformly adopted in all cities, and many 
(perhaps most) urban areas do not currently impose much or any gun control 
of their own. One reason for this, explained in more detail below, is that most 
states preempt some or all local gun control.94 This suggests that existing 
urban gun control laws underrepresent—perhaps significantly so—the breadth 
and scope of laws that cities would pass if they had the authority. 
The primary target of such local regulation is gun-related crime. And 
though the empirics are messy and contested, gun crime is clearly an urban 
problem.95 A 2006-2007 study from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention found that “[t]he 62 center cities of America’s 50 largest metro 
areas account for 15 percent of the population but 39 percent of gun-related 
 
would appear to be the contribution of local laws to the total.”); see also Scott Medlock, NRA 
= No Rational Argument? How the National Rifle Association Exploits Public Irrationality, 11 
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 39, 40 n.6 (2005) (“There are only five federal gun laws, most of which 
restrict who can purchase a firearm and provide for background checks to enforce those 
prohibitions.”). 
88.  The Legal Community Against Violence has compiled a comprehensive review of federal 
and state gun laws, as well as a sampling of major municipal gun laws. See REGULATING 
GUNS IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at i. The first category of regulations it reviews is “Classes 
of Weapons.” See id. at 18-67. 
89.  Id. at 68-143 (reviewing regulations regarding “Sales and Transfers”). 
90.  Id. at 144-75 (reviewing regulations regarding “Gun Dealers and Other Sellers”). 
91.  Id. at 176-215 (reviewing regulations regarding “Gun Ownership”). 
92.  Id. at 216-41 (reviewing regulations regarding “Consumer and Child Safety”). 
93.  In New York City, the cost, delay, and highly discretionary standard involved in permitting 
are thought to be significant deterrents to gun ownership, as the city has issued fewer than 
40,000 premises permits for its 8.3 million residents. WINKLER, supra note 4, at 41; see also 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, 
Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 39 (2009) 
(“New York City has been characterized as maintaining a virtual ban on handguns.”). 
94.  See infra Section III.B. 
95.  Cf. Galvan v. Superior Court, 452 P.2d 930, 938 (Cal. 1969) (in bank) (“That problems with 
firearms are likely to require different treatment in San Francisco County than in Mono 
County should require no elaborate citation of authority.”). 
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murders.”96 A 2013 study found that 69% of gun crimes in Connecticut take 
place in three major cities, which contain just 11% of the state’s population.97 
Connecticut is not unique in that regard. As Carl Bogus notes, “[t]he murder 
rate for the nation’s metropolitan areas is about double the rates for either 
small cities or rural areas,” and “[t]he difference in the robbery rate is even 
more pronounced: the small city rate is only 36% of the metropolitan rate, and 
the rural rate is nine percent of the metropolitan rate.”98 Of course, such crime 
is a complicated phenomenon, subject to influences other than the prevalence 
of guns.99 But at least for some urban populations—African-American men in 
particular100—guns contribute to an increased rate of violent death.101 
One might argue that these are precisely the populations that need guns the 
most. Heller, after all, identified armed self-defense as the “core” and “central 
 
96.  Richard Florida, A Growing Divide in Urban Gun Violence, ATLANTIC CITIES (Jan. 10, 
2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/neighborhoods/2013/01/growing-divide-urban-gun 
-violence/4328. 
97.  The Geography of Gun Violence in Connecticut, CONN. ASS’N FOR HUMAN SERVICES 1 (Feb. 
2013), http://www.cahs.org/pdf/CAHS_CT_Geography%20_of_Gun_Violence.pdf. 
98.  Bogus, supra note 44, at 444; see also Charles C. Branas et al., Urban-Rural Shifts in 
Intentional Firearm Death: Different Causes, Same Results, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1750 (2004) 
(finding firearm homicides to be more prevalent in urban counties and firearm suicides to 
be more prevalent in rural counties). 
99.  See David E. Olson & Michael D. Maltz, Right-to-Carry Concealed Weapon Laws and Homicide 
in Large U.S. Counties: The Effect on Weapon Types, Victim Characteristics, and Victim-Offender 
Relationships, 44 J.L. & ECON. 747, 749 (2001). Compare LOTT, supra note 48 (arguing that 
more guns yield less crime), with Ayres & Donohue, supra note 48 (disputing this claim). 
100.  Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence, and Social Identity in Inner Cities, 
24 CRIME & JUST. 105, 106 (1998) (“Virtually all increases in homicide rates from 1985 to 
1990 among people ten to thirty-four years of age were attributable to deaths among African 
American males; most of the increase was in firearm homicides, and these were 
overwhelmingly concentrated demographically and spatially among African American males 
in urban areas.” (citation omitted)); Marianne Gausche et al., Violent Death in the Pediatric 
Age Group: Rural and Urban Differences, 5 PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY CARE 64, 64 (1989). 
101.  Fagan & Wilkinson, supra note 100, at 109 (referring to the “ecology of danger” of guns and 
violent events in inner-city neighborhoods); see also Jeffrey Fagan et al., Social Contagion of 
Violence, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION 688, 717 
(Daniel J. Flannery et al. eds., 2007) (describing urban gun violence as a “contagion,” and 
concluding that “[b]ecause the recent epidemic cycle of violence was in reality a gun 
homicide epidemic, the case for gun-oriented policing strategies is much stronger than 
practices based on the more diffuse and unsupported theory of disorder control and order-
maintenance strategies” (citations omitted)). 
 the yale law journal 123:82   2013  
102 
 
component” of the Second Amendment.102 That right seems especially salient 
in high-crime urban areas, and unsurprisingly, some city-dwellers respond to 
the threat of urban crime by arming themselves. Adam Winkler writes that 
“one of the most powerful elements in today’s gun rights movement represents 
urban gun owners: people who value firearms as a last line of defense against 
criminals.”103 But the gun ownership statistics described above demonstrate 
that, despite high rates of violent crime, urban residents are disproportionately 
unlikely to purchase and possess guns.104 Indeed, they are much more likely 
than rural residents to support stringent gun regulations.105 Why? 
One obvious explanation is that urban residents have concluded—whether 
rightly or wrongly is beyond the scope of the present argument—that gun 
control will make them safer, despite the limitations such control might place 
on their ability to defend themselves with guns. Another explanation is 
analogous to the account of rural gun culture outlined above: support for gun 
control is a cultural matter not rooted in empirical suppositions regarding 
crime. Indeed, those who support gun control tend to do so notwithstanding 
their skepticism that it actually stops crime.106 Gary Kleck notes that “gun 
control support is not increased by higher crime rates. Residents of high-crime 
cities are not significantly more likely to support gun control than those in low-
 
102.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 630 (2008); see also McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (same). 
103.  WINKLER, supra note 4, at 14; see also Kleck & Gertz, supra note 46, at 178 (finding that those 
who reported using a gun in self-defense “are disproportionately likely to reside in big cities 
compared to other people, and particularly when compared to gun owners, who reside 
disproportionately in rural areas and small towns”); Patrik Jonsson, Gun Nation: Inside 
America’s Gun-Carry Culture, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 11, 2012, http://www 
.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2012/0311/Gun-nation-Inside-America-s-gun-carry-culture (“It 
is here along the edges of America’s urban renaissance that the right-to-carry movement is 
burgeoning . . . .”). 
104.  See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text; see also Steven Thomas Seitz, Guns, Politics, 
and Public Policy, in GUNS IN AMERICA: A READER, supra note 54, at 125, 126 (“[I]n a crowded 
urban environment, the handgun is a greater source of fear than a government’s potential 
failure to maintain the proper social order, save those situations of urban unrest when 
residents of the metropolis, like the citizens of Detroit, rush to buy handguns for a sense of 
security and self-protection.”). 
105.  See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
106.  See GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 338-39 (1997) (noting 
polls suggesting that many Americans favor gun control despite not believing that it will 
reduce crime or violence); see also SPITZER, supra note 1, at 121 (same). 
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crime cities.”107 This suggests that, with regard to gun control, residence in an 
urban area trumps the experience or fear of crime. 
In short, it seems that urban areas have developed a gun control culture 
that is, like rural gun culture, centered on certain core beliefs. As Dan Kahan 
explains, proponents of gun control “find the cultural significations of guns to 
be abhorrent and alarming; they see gun control as symbolizing a competing 
set of positive values, including civilized nonaggression, racial and gender 
equality, and social solidarity.”108 Where members of the rural gun culture see 
firearms as a positive and beneficial part of life, members of the urban gun 
culture see them as threats not only to safety but to their core values. Lee 
Kennett and James LaVerne Anderson conclude, “The city has spawned the 
new and negative view of the gun . . . .”109 
Whether this view is actually “new” is unclear. Justice Scalia apparently 
believes it to be: “I grew up at a time when people were not afraid of people 
with firearms . . . I used to travel the subway from Queens to Manhattan with a 
rifle. Could you imagine doing that today in New York City?”110 But many 
scholars argue that urban gun control culture is older than the Court’s senior 
Justice. Steven Thomas Seitz suggests that modern “cosmopolitan Americans 
who find little utility in the gun” reflect the “remnants of cultural traditions 
brought by emigrants from Europe to America.”111 Even Kennett and Anderson 
conclude that “during the colonial period, the urban areas were relatively free 
of the consistent use of firearms.”112 And as Section II.A describes in more 
detail, comparatively strict urban gun control is a longstanding phenomenon. 
C.  Why the Division Matters 
It would be hard enough to bridge the gap between these views about guns 
if they were fully predicated on disagreement about empirics. But the debate is, 
sometimes for the better and often for the worse, deeper than that.113 It 
 
107.  Kleck, supra note 78, at 395, 396-97 tbl.2. 
108.  Kahan, supra note 12, at 4-5. 
109.  KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 254. 
110.  BISKUPIC, supra note 63, at 346. 
111.  Seitz, supra note 104, at 126. 
112.  KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 48. 
113.  Saulny, supra note 52 (“We’ve been struggling with this whole realm of issues—feelings 
about guns . . . because we’ve talked a lot about gun policy, but not about gun culture.” 
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implicates identity and values,114 and is therefore hard to resolve by marshaling 
evidence for one side or the other. This can be discouraging, because it 
contributes to invective-filled debates in which each side becomes frustrated by 
the other’s inability to see what is obviously “right.”115 Many rural gun owners 
believe—with some justification—that urban gun control advocates are passing 
moral judgments on gun culture,116 while those advocates are in turn 
bewildered by the claim that AR-15s and high-capacity magazines are necessary 
for hunting or self-defense.117 
Fortunately, these ideological differences are geographically concentrated, 
which opens an unexplored possibility for a truce: firearm localism, which 
would give urban areas more leeway to regulate firearms within city limits 
while preserving the ability of rural areas to maintain their strong gun culture. 
Thus even if it is impossible to bridge gun culture and gun control culture,118 it 
is also unnecessary. This should be a welcome result for both camps. Rural 
residents should not have to weigh their desire to own hunting rifles against 
the possibility that urban youth will use handguns to shoot each other. And 
 
(quoting Michael Dimock, Director of the Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press)). 
114.  See, e.g., Zell Miller, The Democratic Party’s Southern Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 
4, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/04/opinion/the-democratic-party-s-southern 
-problem.html (“Gun control . . . is about values. What you are for says a lot about who you 
are and who you aren’t.”); see also Brannon P. Denning, In Defense of a “Thin” Second 
Amendment: Culture, the Constitution, and the Gun Control Debate, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 419, 
420 (2008) (“The gun control debate is at bottom a cultural debate.”). 
115.  See Bruce-Biggs, supra note 1, at 38 (“In addition to the usual political charges of self-
interest and stupidity, participants in the gun-control struggle have resorted to implications 
or downright accusations of mental illness, moral turpitude, and sedition.”). 
116.  Brooks & Collins, supra note 12 (Brooks: “Those who live in rural areas, where gun 
ownership is more common, take arguments about gun control as a sign that the city snobs 
want to tell them how to lead their lives.”); see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Gun Control: 
Separating Reality from Symbolism, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 353, 377 (1994) (arguing that the 
motivation behind “disarming the public . . . is the desire of persons holding certain moral 
and cultural views to have those views symbolically validated by the law and the contrary 
view of others condemned”). 
117.  David Sherfinski, Biden Suggests Shotgun, Not AR-15, for Self-Defense, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/19/biden-shoots-down-comparison 
-drug-and-gun-laws. 
118.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 481 (“The political and value choice [about gun control] 
must be understood in the larger cultural context. Society is obviously deeply divided over 
the issue of gun control and the meaning of the Second Amendment. There appears to be no 
bridge between the two sides.”). 
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advocates of urban gun control should not have to denigrate the cultural 
salience of hunting in Montana when their goal is to limit cheap pistols in 
Manhattan. As New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Boston Mayor 
Thomas Menino, co-chairs of Mayors Against Illegal Guns, recently put it: 
“[W]e know that a policy that is appropriate for a small town in one region of 
the country is not necessarily appropriate for a big city in another region of the 
country.”119 
The possibility of such accommodation is all the more important in the 
wake of Heller and McDonald. By finding the existence of an individual right to 
keep and bear arms independent of militia service, and then incorporating that 
right against state and local governments, the Supreme Court raised the 
possibility of a nationalized approach to gun control—one that would hold 
cities, states, and the federal government to identical rules. The response to 
Heller reveals the fault line implicated by that approach: “The reaction broke 
less along party lines than along the divide between cities wracked with gun 
violence and rural areas where gun ownership is embedded in daily life.”120 
A rigid national standard would flatten these deep differences, potentially 
to the detriment of both gun cultures. For members of the rural gun culture 
who oppose gun control and would prefer stringent review of gun control 
measures, the threat—as in prior incorporation debates—is that their rights 
will be watered down.121 Michael O’Shea argues persuasively that 
the courts are far more likely to protect Southerners, Westerners, and 
Midwesterners in their right to acquire modern self-loading rifles if the 
courts can do so without thereby discarding the “assault weapons” laws 
of the secondary gun culture states, and thereby (as the judges might 
see it) bringing AR-15s to high-rise apartments in Manhattan.122 
Urban residents will likely have the opposite concern: that if the Second 
Amendment is calibrated so as to give rural residents access to firearms for 
 
119.  Michael R. Bloomberg & Thomas M. Menino, About the Coalition: Message from the Co-
Chairs, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html 
/about/about.shtml (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
120.  Chad Livengood, Court Affirms Gun Rights, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Mo.), June 27, 
2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 26840870. 
121.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3095 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When 
one legal standard must prevail across dozens of jurisdictions with disparate needs and 
customs, courts will often settle on a relaxed standard.”). 
122.  O’Shea, supra note 41, at 219. 
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hunting and other recreational uses, it will thereby prevent city-dwellers from 
protecting themselves against firearms that are being used for murder. This 
would effectively force urban residents who might care little about hunting in 
rural areas to subsidize that activity with their own safety. 
But the more serious problem with achieving political compromise is that 
the debate is not simply one about policy analysis. Rather, the underlying 
conflict is largely about values, and there is no way to resolve such a conflict by 
appealing to empirics.123 As David Kairys puts it, “[s]omething else is going on, 
and at its core is a personal, cultural, and political identification of guns with 
personal self-worth and with our highest ideals.”124 Dan Kahan, who along 
with Donald Braman has thoroughly investigated the cultural salience of gun 
control,125 concludes that progress can still be made if voices of moderation, “in 
the spirit of genuine democratic deliberation, appeal to one another for 
understanding and seek policies that accommodate their respective world 
views.”126 
One way to accommodate those worldviews is through geographic 
variation in gun laws, allowing each culture to regulate itself.127 Some scholars 
have endorsed such an approach, but they have focused almost exclusively on 
 
123.  MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE OVER 
GUNS 101 (2007) (“It would be nice to think that disagreements over policy could be 
resolved by empirical evidence. And maybe some can—but not, I think, policy disputes 
about which people care intensely.”); Kahan & Braman, supra note 12, at 1292 (noting that 
people will “credit or dismiss empirical evidence . . . depending on whether it coheres or 
conflicts with their cultural values”). 
124.  David Kairys, Rebuttal, Challenging the Normalcy of Handgun Violence, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 194, 198 (2007). 
125.  See Kahan, supra note 12; Kahan & Braman, supra note 12. 
126.  Kahan, supra note 12, at 11. 
127.  Eric Gorovitz, California Dreamin’: The Myth of State Preemption of Local Firearm Regulation, 
30 U.S.F. L. REV. 395, 396 (1996) (“As with other public health problems, wide variation 
exists among communities in the nature and extent of firearm-related morbidity and 
mortality. Such variation suggests that local governments need the ability to adopt 
reasonable measures to deal with the specific problems faced by their communities.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN’S 
GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 174 (1987) (“Significant variations exist in attitudes toward 
handguns, and it is only to be expected that these attitudinal differences should more 
quickly lead to a wider spectrum of state and local variation than to a unified national 
strategy.”); Anthony P. Badaracco, Note, Firearm Federalism, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
761, 789 (2010) (“[I]t is in precisely this sort of situation, when citizens’ interests vary and 
the law is unclear, that it is most important that regulation take place at a more local level of 
government.”). 
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potential diversity of state laws, and on the possibility of increased deference to 
state as opposed to federal regulation.128 O’Shea, for example, argues that 
courts should employ a bifurcated standard of review under which “national 
gun laws receive strict scrutiny, while state and local gun laws receive 
intermediate scrutiny.”129 There is much merit in this approach. But as the 
preceding discussion suggests, it would not capture the important and 
consistent differences between urban and rural areas.130 
This discussion has painted a picture using very broad strokes, and 
therefore cannot capture the details. Some rural areas might have stringent gun 
control—bans on concealed carrying originated in the comparatively rural 
South131—and many major cities definitely do not.132 And many millions of 
people live in areas dominated by a culture of which they are not a part. The 
best that this discussion can demonstrate is that gun culture is 
disproportionately concentrated in rural areas, and gun control culture in 
urban areas. Firearm localism would take that geographic difference seriously. 
i i .  the case for firearm localism 
The first Part of this Article focused mainly on political and sociological 
characterizations of America’s two gun cultures. One could, however, accept 
the basic accuracy of these admittedly imprecise portraits without concluding 
that Second Amendment doctrine should, or even can, take account of them. 
Perhaps the distinction between urban and rural areas is the kind of division 
that, no matter how deep, the Amendment must ignore, like differential rates 
of gun crime and victimization between men and women or African Americans 
and whites. 
 
128.  See, e.g., O’Shea, supra note 41, at 203-04. 
129.  Id. at 204. 
130.  See, e.g., The Geography of Gun Violence in Connecticut, supra note 97, at 1 (finding that, 
within the state of Connecticut, 69% of gun crimes in the state take place in three major 
cities, which account for just 11% of the state’s population). 
131.  CLAYTON E. CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC: DUELING, 
SOUTHERN VIOLENCE, AND MORAL REFORM 1 (1999) (“[T]he states commonly thought of 
today as ‘redneck country’ . . . were in the forefront of laws regulating the concealed 
carrying of deadly weapons.”). 
132.  As noted below, however, the latter may be a function of state preemption laws that forbid 
local gun control. See infra Section III.B. 
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This Part argues to the contrary that the Second Amendment need not be 
blind to the reality of our gun cultures, that urban gun control should receive 
increased deference and, symmetrically, that rural gun rights are entitled to 
increased protection.133 Constitutional law generally, and Second Amendment 
doctrine in particular, already provide the tools with which to achieve this 
tailoring. Both the historical-categorical approach employed by the majorities 
in Heller and McDonald and the interest-balancing approach endorsed by the 
dissents (and embraced by many lower courts in subsequent cases) permit 
special deference to urban gun control—the former because of the 
“longstanding” tradition of stricter urban gun regulation; the latter because 
cities have different interests than rural areas when it comes to gun control. 
A.  The Historical-Categorical Approach to Second Amendment Localism 
The historical-categorical approach evaluates the constitutionality of 
contemporary gun control laws based on their similarity to “longstanding” 
restrictions134—it focuses on tradition, rather than cost-benefit analysis. And as 
the following discussion explains, American cities have traditionally had much 
more stringent gun control than rural areas. To the degree that Second 
Amendment doctrine follows the historical-categorical path, it should continue 
to give broad leeway to urban gun control, precisely because of this lineage. 
In Heller, the Supreme Court blessed as constitutional a wide array of gun 
control laws, not because they reduce crime or other harms, but because of 
their historical lineage. The majority specifically rejected what it called a 
“freestanding interest-balancing approach,”135 instead turning to historical 
practice to discern the permissible scope of firearm regulations. In a passage 
that has inspired a fair bit of confusion and criticism,136 the majority wrote: 
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of 
the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
 
133.  Establishing an appropriate baseline from which to make these adjustments is beyond the 
scope of this Article—the argument here is simply one of tailoring. For notable efforts to do 
the former, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh 
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013); and Volokh, supra note 
32. 
134.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008). 
135.  Id. at 634 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136.  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 21-22. 
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possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms.137 
For similar tradition-based reasons, the Court held that the Amendment 
permits the prohibition of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”138 In McDonald, 
the Court reaffirmed its approval of these forms of gun control,139 and of the 
historical-categorical approach as well.140 
It seems that those “traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the 
Court’s principles are to be formed,” as Justice Scalia explained at length in 
another context: 
[W]hen a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of 
Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, 
and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, 
we have no proper basis for striking it down. Such a venerable and 
accepted tradition is not to be laid on the examining table and 
scrutinized for its conformity to some abstract principle of First 
Amendment adjudication devised by this Court. To the contrary, such 
traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the Court’s principles 
are to be formed. They are, in these uncertain areas, the very points of 
reference by which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices is to 
be figured out. . . . I know of no other way to formulate a constitutional 
jurisprudence that reflects, as it should, the principles adhered to, over 
time, by the American people, rather than those favored by the personal 
 
137.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
138.  Id. at 627. 
139.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“We made it 
clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on . . . longstanding regulatory measures . 
. . . We repeat those assurances here.”). 
140.  Id. at 3050. Allen Rostron notes that the wording of Heller leaves it a bit unclear as to 
whether “longstanding” refers only to laws about felons and the mentally ill, or to all the 
listed gun control laws, but that “Justice Alito’s opinion in McDonald seems to assume that 
‘longstanding’ describes every category of laws on the list, not just prohibitions on guns for 
felons and the mentally ill.” Rostron, supra note 21, at 715 n.64. 
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(and necessarily shifting) philosophical dispositions of a majority of 
this Court.141 
Substituting “Second” for “First,” this passage describes the approach Justice 
Scalia took in Heller.142 But although the concept of a longstanding regulation 
was central to the holding of the case, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did little 
to explain what it means. As Allen Rostron notes, the Court “did not specify 
what it takes for a law to qualify as longstanding.”143 Indeed, it is unclear 
whether the practices so designated can accurately be described as 
longstanding.144 
Somewhat more detail can be gleaned from the Court’s efforts to use what 
has been called the “common use” test145 to determine what kinds of “Arms” 
are protected by the Second Amendment. The majority read its precedents to 
stand for the proposition that “the Second Amendment does not protect those 
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes.”146 Handguns, for example, are covered in part because of their 
longstanding popularity for self-defense use: 
 
141.  Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95-96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted 
in Volokh, supra note 32, at 1450-51). 
142.  The Court has similarly relied on tradition to help identify which rights are covered by the 
Due Process Clauses. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003); Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-47 
(1992); see also Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the 
Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 174 (describing “traditionalist” approach to 
constitutional adjudication as distinct from originalist and sociological jurisprudential 
approaches, by which “the open-ended, normative language of the Constitution should be 
interpreted in light of the long-standing legal practices and traditions of the nation”). 
143.  Rostron, supra note 21, at 715; United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (“A 1938 law [banning possession by felons] may be ‘longstanding’ from the 
perspective of 2008, when Heller was decided, but 1938 is 147 years after the states ratified 
the Second Amendment.”). 
144.  See sources cited supra note 21 (questioning whether felon-in-possession rules are 
“longstanding”). 
145.  Volokh, supra note 32, at 1478-81 (describing and criticizing the “common use” test). 
146.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (citing United States v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 174, 178 (1939)). At oral argument, Justice Scalia suggested that the word “Arms” in the 
Second Amendment could be used in a “specialized sense” to denote a weapon “that was 
used in militias and . . . is nowadays commonly held.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290). 
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It is enough to note, as we have observed, that the American people 
have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense 
weapon. . . . Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular 
weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a 
complete prohibition of their use is invalid.147 
By contrast, bans on certain other weapons are “fairly supported by the 
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual 
weapons.’”148 
The key point for present purposes is not the precise contours of the 
“Arms” protected by the Second Amendment, but rather the method by which 
the historical-categorical approach identifies the boundaries of the 
Amendment: by looking to history and tradition, rather than contemporary 
costs and benefits.149 As the Court’s analysis of common use and dangerous 
and unusual weapons suggests, the relevant history is not simply that of the 
Founding era, but extends at least through the 1800s.150 Many lower courts 
have, in the wake of Heller and McDonald, taken a similar approach. In United 
States v. Rene E.,151 for example, the First Circuit rejected a Second Amendment 
challenge to the federal ban on juvenile possession of handguns. The court 
employed a kind of historical analysis, but as Allen Rostron notes, the First 
Circuit “cited no primary sources from the eighteenth century or even the first 
half of the nineteenth century, such as laws, judicial decisions, treatises, or 
other writings, addressing the issue of juvenile access to guns.”152 The court 
nonetheless found that although the federal law at issue was not enacted until 
1994, state laws regulating juvenile possession of guns and other weapons could 
 
147.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
148.  Id. at 627 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148). 
149.  The two are not necessarily exclusive. Historian Jack Rakove, for example, supports the use 
of contemporary cost-benefit analysis in Second Amendment doctrine, but has also written 
that “[i]t is doubtless important to establish as well that [a] regulation is made legitimate by 
a long history of prior legislation, judicial doctrines permitting such legislation,” and several 
other historical factors. Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of 
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 107 (2000); see also infra notes 227-230 and 
accompanying text (describing connections between the two approaches). 
150.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 605 (defending use of nineteenth century sources). 
151.  583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009). 
152.  Rostron, supra note 21, at 741. 
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be found at least as early as the second half of the nineteenth century,153 and 
that this was sufficient to uphold the federal ban. 
The historical record supports a similarly deferential approach to urban 
gun control. To be sure, the historical evidence is not uniform, nor is the 
analysis here exhaustive.154 Not every city, nor perhaps even a majority of 
them, has enacted handgun bans or other stringent gun control. But the 
geographic differences are nonetheless striking, and the historical evidence is at 
least as comprehensive and longstanding as that supporting other Second 
Amendment rules like the felon carve-out.155 
This geographic variation, and specifically the urban/rural divide, predates 
the Second Amendment itself. As early as the 1300s, London’s statutes 
provided that no person shall “be found going or wandering about the Streets 
. . . after Curfew tolled . . . with Sword or Buckler, or other Arms for doing 
Mischief . . . nor in any other Manner, unless he be a great Man or other lawful 
Person of good repute, or their certain Messenger, having their Warrants to go 
from one to another, with Lantern in hand.”156 The oft-cited Statute of 
Northampton, enacted in 1328, provided that “no Man great nor small, of what 
Condition soever he be,” shall “ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, 
Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part 
elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their Bodies to 
Prison at the King’s pleasure.”157 Precisely what the Statute of Northampton 
prohibited is a matter of debate. Some conclude that it banned armed travel,158 
while others say it “was understood by the Framers as covering only those 
circumstances where carrying arms was unusual and therefore terrifying.”159 
 
153.  Rene E., 583 F.3d at 14-15. 
154.  I am particularly grateful to Georgetown 3L Mark Frassetto for identifying many of the 
historical materials cited here. A document collecting much of his research is available at 
Mark Anthony Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons Legislation up to the Early 20th Century, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200991 (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
155.  See sources cited supra note 21 (questioning whether felon-in-possession rules are 
“longstanding”). 
156.  Statutes for the City of London, 1285, 13 Edw. (Eng.). 
157.  Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.). 
158.  See, e.g., Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History 
Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 8 (2012); Darrell A.H. Miller, 
Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1317-
18 (2009) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149). 
159.  Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101 
(2009). It is possible that both readings are “correct.” As Saul Cornell notes, Blackstone 
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Under either of these readings, however, the statute was geographically 
contextual and tailored to public places like “Fairs” and “Markets.” 
Many local regulations at the time echoed the Statute of Northampton’s 
focus on weapons possession in populated areas. For example, another 
fourteenth-century London law proclaimed that “no stranger or privy person, 
save those deputed to keep the peace, shall go armed therein after they shall 
come to their lodgings.”160 That law’s fifteenth-century successor “forb[ade] 
any man of whatsoever estate or condition to go armed within the city and 
suburbs, or any except lords, knights and esquires with a sword.”161 Blackstone 
himself explained, by analogy to urban prohibitions in ancient Greece: 
The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual 
weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good 
people of the land; and is particularly prohibited by the statute of 
Northampton, upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment 
during the king’s pleasure: in like manner as, by the laws of Solon, 
every Athenian was finable who walked about the city in armour.162 
Echoes of the Statute of Northampton could be heard in colonial America,163 
and urban tailoring also seems to have been embedded in Anglo-American 
 
(whom Miller cites) and Sir William Hawkins (on whom Volokh relies) had slightly 
different interpretations of the law in question, and since “the Founders were familiar with 
both English commentators . . . it seems likely that there may have been a range of views on 
interpreting this question.” Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: 
Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1713 (2012). 
160.  2 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, RICHARD II, at 92 (Nov. 2, 1381, Westminster) (H.C. 
Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1920); see also JOHN CARPENTER, LIBER ALBUS [THE WHITE BOOK] 335 
(Henry Thomas Riley ed., 1861) (1419) (specifying “[t]hat no one, of whatever condition he 
be, [may] go armed in the said city or in the suburbs, or carry arms, by day or by night,” 
except certain people connected to “great lords” or the royal family or when commanded to 
keep the peace by those same individuals). 
161.  3 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, HENRY IV, at 485 (Jan. 30, 1409, Westminster) (A.E. 
Stamp ed., 1931). 
162.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148-49 (citation omitted). 
163.  See, e.g., Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. XXV, reprinted in 2 THE PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 259 (I. Thomas & E. T. Andrews eds., 1801); A 
COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A PUBLIC AND 
PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 33 (Augustine Davis 1794); FRANCOIS-XAVIER 
MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 60-61 (Newbern 1792); see also Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 
944 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting the Statute of Northampton’s 
influence on the colonies, in particular Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia). 
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common law rules that treated arms-bearing differently in urban and rural 
areas. As Saul Cornell explains: 
The nature of the common law provided considerable flexibility in 
deciding exactly what constituted an affray. . . . A party of men hunting 
in season in Pennsylvania would not under most circumstances have 
been viewed as committing an affray, while an armed assembly riding 
into town might well be viewed as such and could be legally disarmed 
by a justice of the peace.164 
Once again, the city line appears to have made the difference. 
Perhaps even more notable (because they earned the attention of the 
Justices in Heller165) were laws regulating the use of weapons and storage of 
gunpowder in urban areas. As Cornell and Nathan DeDino note, some 
“[s]tates prohibited the use of firearms on certain occasions and in certain 
locations”166—with, in some instances, the city limits defining those 
locations.167 Such laws were enacted in growing population centers such as 
Boston,168 Philadelphia,169 and New York City,170 and governed private homes 
 
164.  SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 30 (2006); see also Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well 
Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 501 
(2004) (“Defining exactly what circumstances constituted the crime of affray was . . . [a] 
complex, context-bound judgment.”). 
165.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 631-34 (2008); id. at 683-87 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
166.  Cornell & DeDino, supra note 164, at 505. 
167.  Id. at 505 n.120 (citing Act of Apr. 22, 1785, ch. 81, 1784-85 N.Y. Laws 152; Act of Nov. 16, 
1821, ch. LXLIII, 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 78; Act of Jan. 30, 1847, ch. 79, 1846-1847 Va. Acts 67; 
A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA: NOW IN FORCE 13, 39-
40, 85, 197-200, 315-17 (1742), all of which applied specifically to cities). 
168.  Cornell & DeDino, supra note 164, at 511 n.160 (citing Act of June 19, 1801, ch. XX, 1801 
Mass. Acts 507 (regulating storage of gunpowder in Boston); Act of June 26, 1792, ch. X, 
1792 Mass. Acts 208 (same); Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. XIII, 1783 Mass. Acts 218 (same); Act of 
Oct. 4, 1780, ch. V, 1780 Mass. Acts 326 (same)). 
169.  Cornell & DeDino, supra note 164, at 511 n.161 (citing Act of Dec. 6, 1783, ch. MLIX, 11 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. 209; An Act for the Continuance of an Act, Entitled “An Act for the Better 
Securing the City of Philadelphia from the Danger of Gunpowder,” ch. CCCLXXII, 1746 Pa. 
Laws 52; An Act for the Better Securing [of] the City of Philadelphia and Its Liberties from 
Danger of Gunpowder, § II, 1725 Pa. Laws 31). 
170.  Act of Apr. 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 N.Y. Laws 627, cited in Cornell & DeDino, supra note 164, at 
511 n. 162. 
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as well as public storage. Boston, for example, provided that “the depositing of 
loaded Arms in the Houses of the Town of Boston, is dangerous” and that no 
loaded firearms were allowed in any “Dwelling-House, Stable, Barn, Out-
house, Store, Ware-house, Shop or other Building.”171 The prevalence of these 
laws is especially notable—and, incidentally, the historical-categorical test all 
the more difficult to satisfy—because gun violence simply was not the problem 
then that it would later become. Jack Rakove points out that “because 
eighteenth-century firearms were not nearly as lethal as those available today, 
we similarly cannot expect the discussants of the late 1780s to have cast their 
comments about keeping and bearing arms in the same terms that we 
would.”172 
Safe storage laws also applied to commercial enterprises handling 
gunpowder within cities. Cornell and DeDino note that “New York City 
required ships to unload gunpowder at a magazine within twenty-four hours 
of arrival in the harbor and before the ship ‘hawl[ed] along side of any wharf, 
pier or key within the city,’” while “Boston subjected any ‘Gun Powder . . . kept 
on board any ship or other vessel laying to, or grounded at any wharf within 
the port of Boston’ to confiscation.”173 
Regional variation was already becoming apparent,174 but gunpowder 
restrictions applied in towns of all sizes, not simply the big three of Boston, 
New York, and Philadelphia.175 The Pennsylvania statutes establishing the 
 
171.  Act of Mar. 1, 1783, chap. XIII, 1783 Mass. Acts 218, cited in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 631 (2008). 
172.  Rakove, supra note 149, at 110; see also Cornell, supra note 159, at 1713 (“Interpersonal 
violence, including gun violence, simply was not a problem in the Founding era that 
warranted much attention and therefore produced no legislation.”); Eric H. Monkkonen, 
Homicide in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 809, 816-17 
(2002) (“Murders in both New York City and Los Angeles reflect the change: in both cities, 
guns accounted for about seven percent of murders before 1851 and about twenty-five 
percent (LA) and twenty-two percent (NYC) from 1855-1875.”). 
173.  Cornell & DeDino, supra note 164, at 512 (quoting Act of June 19, 1801, ch. XX, 1801 Mass. 
Acts 507; Act of Apr. 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 N.Y. Laws 628). 
174.  Cornell, supra note 159, at 1711 (quoting 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. 
B, at 14 (1803)) (“In many parts of the United States, a man no more thinks, of going out of 
his house on any occasion, without his rifle or musket in his hand, than an European fine 
gentleman without his sword by his side.”). 
175.  See Cornell & DeDino, supra note 164, at 511 (stating that gunpowder storage laws “were not 
limited to the largest cities”). 
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town of Carlisle, for example, provided that anyone keeping gunpowder “in 
any house, shop, cellar, store or other place, within said borough” must store it 
“in the highest story of the house . . . unless it be at least fifty yards from any 
dwelling-house.”176 Other forms of gun control were similarly thought 
permissible at the local level. Many states—Florida, New Jersey, Nebraska, and 
Tennessee among them—gave some newly incorporated towns the power to 
“restrain and punish . . . shooting and carrying guns, and enact penalties and 
enforce the same” consistent with the constitution and laws of the state.177 
Cleveland similarly passed an ordinance prohibiting the discharge of firearms 
in the city.178 These laws were not merely artifacts of the Founding era, but 
would remain common even in the years following the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.179 
 
176.  Act of Apr. 13, 1782, ch. XIV, § XLII, 1781-1782 Pa. Laws 25, 41-42; see also An Act to Prevent 
the Storage of Gun-powder in Larger Quantities than one Hundred Pounds, Within the 
City of Mobile, 1848 Ala. Laws 121; Act of Sept. 12, 1783, ch. LXXVI, § XLII, 1782-1783 Pa. 
Laws 124, 140 (concerning the storage of gunpowder in the town of Reading). 
177.  Act of Dec. 3, 1825, ch. CCXCII, 1825 Tenn. Priv. Acts 307 (incorporating towns of 
Winchester and Reynoldsburgh); see also An Act Incorporating the Cities of Hartford, New 
Haven, New London, Norwich and Middletown, ch. 1, § 20, 1836 Conn. Pub. Acts 104-05 
(“[T]he court of common council . . . shall have power to make by-laws . . . relative to 
prohibiting and regulating the bringing in, and conveying out, or storing of gun-powder in 
said cities . . . .”); An Act to Incorporate the City of Key West, ch. 58, § 8, 1838 Fla. Laws 70 
(“Be it further enacted, That the common council of said city shall have power and authority 
to prevent and remove nuisances . . . to provide safe storage of gun-powder . . . .”); An Act 
to Incorporate and Establish the City of Dubuque, ch. 123, § 12, 1845 Iowa Acts 119 (giving 
“power to regulate by ordinance the keeping and sale of gun-powder within the city”); An 
Act to Incorporate Nebraska City, § 25, 1867 Neb. Laws 68 (“The city council shall regulate 
the keeping and sale of gun-powder within the city . . . .”); An Act to Incorporate the City of 
Trenton, § 24, 1837 N.J. Laws 373 (“And be it enacted, That it shall and may be lawful for 
the common council . . . to pass such ordinances . . . for regulating the keeping and 
transporting of gunpowder or other combustible or dangerous materials . . . .”).  
178.  See Cornell & DeDino, supra note 164, at 515 (citing Laws, for the Regulation and Government 
of the Village of Cleaveland, § 9, in CLEAVELAND HERALD, Aug. 15, 1820, at 1). 
179.  See, e.g., An Act to Revise and Amend the Charter of the City of Newport, § 6, 1874 Ky. Acts 
327, 332 (“To prohibit the manufacture of gunpowder or other explosive, dangerous, or 
noxious compounds or substances in said city, and to regulate their sale and storage by 
license.”); An Act to Incorporate Cities of the First Class in the State of Nebraska, § 47, 1869 
Neb. Laws 29, 53 (“The City Council shall have power to license all . . . venders of gun 
powder . . . .”); An Act to Prohibit Shooting Guns or Pistols in the Towns of Sparta, 
Alleghany County, and Jefferson, Ashe county, § 1, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 250 (“That it shall 
be unlawful for any person wantonly or in sport to shoot or discharge any gun or pistol in or 
within one hundred yards of any street in or any public road leading out of the towns of 
Sparta in Alleghany county and Jefferson in Ashe county for a distance of one-fourth mile 
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It might be tempting to dismiss these laws as products of the distinct and 
unrepresentative cultural values of “coastal states and cities.”180 But the 
urban/rural divide appears to have been even more pronounced out West. As 
noted in the Introduction, even the towns most associated with gun violence—
Dodge City and Tombstone, for example—required people to leave their 
weapons at the city limits when arriving in town.181 Indeed, many frontier 
towns passed “blanket ordinances against the carrying of arms by anyone,” and 
the “carrying of dangerous weapons of any type, concealed or otherwise, by 
persons other than law enforcement officers” was generally forbidden.182 
Pointing to these prohibitions,183 historian Garry Wills concludes that “[t]he 
West was not settled by the gun but by gun-control laws.”184 
Wills’s use of the word “settled” is significant, for guns were far more 
prevalent, and far less regulated, outside of settlements. As Adam Winkler 
describes: 
Guns were widespread on the frontier, but so was gun regulation. 
Almost everyone carried firearms in the untamed wilderness, which was 
full of dangerous Natives, outlaws, and bears. In the frontier towns, 
however, where people lived and businesses operated, the law often 
forbade people from toting their guns around.185 
The ghosts of those “Natives, outlaws, and bears” shuffled through the 
Supreme Court during Heller’s oral argument, as Justice Kennedy invoked the 
“the right of people living in the wilderness to protect themselves” and of “the 
concern of the remote settler to defend himself and his family against hostile 
Indian tribes and outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like 
 
from the courthouses in said towns.”); Crimes and Punishment, § 4, 1890 Okla. Sess. Laws 
412, 474 (“Every person who makes or keeps gunpowder or saltpeter within any city or 
village, and every person who carries gunpowder through the streets thereof, in any 
quantity or manner such as is prohibited by law, or by any ordinance of such city or village, 
is guilty of a misdemeanor.”). 
180.  O’Shea, supra note 41, at 209-11 (describing contemporary “secondary” gun culture as being 
concentrated in these areas). 
181.  WINKLER, supra note 4, at 13. 
182.  DYKSTRA, supra note 6, at 121. 
183.  GARRY WILLS, REAGAN’S AMERICA: INNOCENTS AT HOME 89 (1987) (“[T]hose entering the 
towns had to come disarmed, since it was against the law for anyone but law enforcement 
officials to carry a gun.”). 
184.  Id. at 380. 
185.  WINKLER, supra note 4, at 165 (citing DYKSTRA, supra note 6). 
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that.”186 This might well be an accurate portrait of the “remote settler” in the 
“wilderness,” but the use of guns was heavily circumscribed in towns. If the 
former is significant enough to shape the meaning of the Second Amendment, 
then the latter should be as well. 
Of course, how well these laws were enforced and whether they were 
effective is difficult to say, and it is all but impossible to know precisely how 
prevalent they were. David Courtwright writes that “[t]he gun laws were a 
good idea but poorly enforced, especially during the 1870s, the worst decade of 
killing on the cattle frontier.”187 On the other hand, Robert Dykstra describes 
instances of zealous enforcement of urban gun control laws in the West,188 and 
Robert Spitzer similarly concludes that “[e]ven in the most violence-prone 
towns, the western cattle towns, vigilantism and lawlessness were only briefly 
tolerated. . . . Prohibitions against carrying guns were strictly enforced, and 
there were few homicides.”189 Indeed, Courtwright himself notes that “[t]he 
situation changed in the 1880s and 1890s. As the threat of Indians and outlaws 
receded and the regular police system gradually became more professional and 
efficient, it was harder to justify carrying personal weapons for self-defense.”190 
In other words, as functioning towns emerged from the frontier, the need and 
tolerance for private gun use decreased. This was reflected in law, as some 
states made it illegal to fire weapons within the limits of a city or town—this 
was true during the colonial era,191 between the colonial era and the passage of 
 
186.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 30, District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570 (2008) 
(No. 07-290). 
187.  David T. Courtwright, The Cowboy Subculture, in GUNS IN AMERICA, supra note 54, at 86, 96. 
188.  DYKSTRA, supra note 6, at 137 (describing, for example, the nearly one-hundred arrests in 
1873 alone in Ellsworth, Texas). 
189.  SPITZER, supra note 1, at 11 (footnote omitted). 
190.  Courtwright, supra note 187, at 96. 
191.  An Act to Prevent the Firing of Guns Charged with Shot or Ball in the Town of Boston, ch. 
X, § 2, 1746 Mass. Acts 208 (“That no Person shall . . . discharge any Gun or Pistol charged 
with Shot or Ball in the town of Boston (the Islands thereto belonging excepted) or in any 
Part of the Harbor between the Castle and said Town . . . .”); An Act for the More Effectual 
Preventing Accidents Which May Happen by Fire, and for Suppressing Idleness, 
Drunkenness, and Other Debaucheries, 1750 Pa. Laws 208 (“That if any person or persons 
whatsoever, within any county town, or within any other town or borough, in this province, 
already built and settled, or hereafter to be built and settled . . . shall fire any gun or other 
fire-arm, or shall make, or cause to be made, or sell or utter, or offer to expose to sale, any 
squibs, rockets or other fire-works, or shall cast, throw or fire any squibs, rockets or other 
fire-works, within any of the said towns or boroughs, without the Governor’s special license 
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the Fourteenth Amendment,192 and again after.193 Some of these laws were 
extremely specific about their geographic reach. One 1866 Texas statute, for 
example, provided in part: 
It shall not be lawful for any person to discharge any gun, pistol, or fire 
arms of any description whatever, on, or across any public square, 
street, or alley, in any city or town in this State; Provided, this Act shall 
not be so construed as to apply to the “outer town,” or suburbs, of any 
city or town.194 
Other laws flatly prohibited the carrying of nearly any weapon within towns, 
cities, villages, and settlements.195 
 
for the same, every such person or persons, so offending, shall be subject to the like 
penalties and forfeitures . . . .”). 
192.  An Act Prohibiting the Firing of Guns and Other Fire Arms in the City of New Haven, 1845 
Conn. Pub. Acts 10 (“[E]very person who shall fire any gun or other fire-arm of any kind 
whatever within the limits of the city of New Haven, except for military purposes, without 
permission first obtained from the mayor of said city, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding seven dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than thirty days.”); 
An Act to Prevent the Discharging of Fire-Arms Within the Towns and Villages, and Other 
Places Within this State, and for Other Purposes, § 1, 4 Del. Laws 329; An Act to 
Incorporate the Town of Baltimore, Hickman County, § 10, 1856 Ky. Acts 139 (“Any person 
who shall shoot off a gun or pistol, or shall run or gallop a horse creature in said town, shall 
be liable to a fine of not less than two nor more than four dollars . . . .”). 
193.  An Act to Prevent the Shooting or Firing of Guns or Pistols in the Village of Vineville, in the 
County of Bibb § 1, 1875 Ga. Laws 189 (“That from and after the passage of this Act it shall 
not be lawful for any person or persons to discharge, fire or shoot off any gun or guns, pistol 
or pistols (except military salutes, and persons discharging, firing or shooting guns or 
pistols on their own premises, or on the premises of another, with the permission of the 
owner thereof), within three hundred yards . . . of the public road running through the 
village of Vineville . . . .”); An Act to Prevent Parties from Shooting Within the Limits of 
Towns and Private Enclosures, § 1, 1873 Mont. Laws 46 (“That it shall be unlawful for any 
person to fire any gun, pistol or any fire-arm, of whatever description, within the limits of 
any town, city, or village in this territory, or within the limits of any private enclosure which 
shall contain a dwelling house.”); Lincoln, Neb., Gen. Ordinances art. 26, § 1 (1895) (“No 
person, except an officer of the law in the discharge of his duty, shall fire or discharge any 
gun, pistol, fowling-piece, or other fire-arm, within the corporate limits of the city of 
Lincoln, under penalty of a fine of ten dollars for each offense.”). 
194.  An Act to Prohibit the Discharging of Fire Arms in Certain Places Therein Named, ch. 170, § 
1, 1866 Tex. Gen. Laws 210. 
195.  E.g., Crimes Against the Public Peace, § 385, 1901 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1251-52 (“If any person 
within any settlement, town, village or city within this territory shall carry on or about his 
person, saddle, or in saddlebags, any pistol, dirk, dagger, slung-shot, sword-cane, spear, 
brass knuckles, bowie-knife, or any other kind of knife manufactured or sold for purposes of 
 
 the yale law journal 123:82   2013  
120 
 
Urban gun control was thus a nationwide phenomenon, reaching from the 
harbors of Boston to the dusty streets of Tombstone, and it took many forms. 
Important changes were on the horizon, including the professionalization and 
arming of urban police forces196 and the passage of the first major federal gun 
control laws in the 1930s,197 but gun control has remained consistently stronger 
and more stringent in cities and towns than in rural areas. In 1976, 
Washington, D.C., passed its handgun ban, which would later be struck down 
in Heller.198 In 1981, local gun control gained national attention when the 
Village of Morton Grove, Illinois, passed its own local handgun ban.199 The 
 
offense or defense, he shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five nor more than 
one hundred dollars; and, in addition thereto, shall forfeit to the county in which he is 
convicted the weapon or weapons so carried.”); id. § 390 (“Persons traveling may be permitted 
to carry arms within settlements or towns of the territory, for one-half hour after arriving in 
such settlements or towns, and while going out of such towns or settlements . . . .”); An Act 
Regulating the Use and Carrying of Deadly Weapons in Idaho Territory, § 1, 1888 Idaho 
Sess. Laws 23 (“[I]t is unlawful for any person, except United States officials, officials of 
Idaho Territory, County officials, Peace officers, Guards of any jail, and officers or 
employees of any Express Company on duty, to carry, exhibit, or flourish any dirk, dirk-
knife, sword, sword-cane, pistol, gun or other deadly weapons, within the limits or confines 
of any city, town or village or in any public assembly of Idaho Territory.”); Act of Jan. 14, 
1853, §1, N.M. Laws 67 (“That each and every person is prohibited from carrying short 
arms, such as pistols, daggers, knives, and other deadly weapons, about their persons 
concealed, within the settlements . . . .”) (emphasis added)); An Act to Regulate the Keeping 
and Bearing of Deadly Weapons, § 1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25 (forbidding, with exceptions 
for travelers and in one’s home or place of business, any person but a law officer from 
carrying a “pistol, dirk, dagger, slung-shot, sword-cane, spear, brass-knuckles, bowie-knife, 
or any kind of knife manufactured or sold for the purposes of offense or defense” in a city 
“unless he has reasonable grounds for fearing an unlawful attack on his person, and that 
such ground of attack shall be immediate and pressing . . . .”); 1876 Wyo. Sess. Laws 352, § 1 
(forbidding any resident or sojourner from bearing, “concealed or openly, any fire arm or 
other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village”). 
196.  See William Hosley, Guns, Gun Culture, and the Peddling of Dreams, in GUNS IN AMERICA, 
supra note 54, at 47, 53 (“At the same time, cities across the country campaigned to transform 
the archaic constable-watch system into a modern uniformed police force that, increasingly 
and with great controversy, became armed with guns.”); cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 715 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he subsequent development of modern urban 
police departments, by diminishing the need to keep loaded guns nearby in case of 
intruders, would have moved any such right even further away from the heart of the 
Amendment’s more basic protective ends.”). 
197.  National Firearms Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5849 (2006)). 
198.  See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.02(a)(4), 7-2507.02 (2001), ruled unconstitutional in 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
199.  UTTER, supra note 29, at 200-01. 
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ordinance survived a Second Amendment challenge,200 but inspired a political 
backlash that helped lead to the passage of preemption laws in dozens of 
states.201 
Heller’s historical-categorical approach has been heavily criticized,202 and 
this brief discussion cannot fully iron out its wrinkles. Nor does the evidence 
presented here demonstrate a unanimous or unbroken tradition of urban gun 
control. The historical record is too spotty for that, but it is as at least as strong 
as the historical evidence the Supreme Court found sufficient to support 
specific carve-outs such as the felon-in-possession ban. It demonstrates that 
local tailoring of the right to keep and bear arms has been significant and 
historically consistent. Building on that evidence, the argument here is modest: 
to the degree Heller makes such history relevant, the Second Amendment can 
and should incorporate it. 
B.  The Pragmatic-Balancing Approach to Second Amendment Localism 
Dissenting in both Heller and McDonald, Justice Breyer did not discount 
the importance of the kind of historical analysis set out above. But, he 
concluded in Heller, determining whether a particular gun control law is 
constitutional requires a sensitive weighing of “practicalities, the statute’s 
rationale, the problems that called it into being, its relation to those 
objectives—in a word, the details.”203 Rather than focusing exclusively on 
historical analogues of modern gun control laws, Justice Breyer endorsed an 
interest-balancing inquiry, “with the interests protected by the Second 
Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the 
other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly 
burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.”204 In doing so, he 
noted that urban areas “have different experiences with gun-related death, 
 
200.  Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). 
201.  GOSS, supra note 29, at 162-65. 
202.  See sources cited supra note 22. 
203.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Jack Rakove, himself a historian, endorses 
“the seemingly commonsense notion that would hold that this is the one clause of the 
Constitution for which conclusions drawn from consequentialist arguments should weigh 
most strongly.” Rakove, supra note 149, at 107. 
204.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Richard Schragger, The Last 
Progressive: Justice Breyer, Heller, and “Judicial Judgment,” 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 283, 284 
(2008) (describing Breyer’s alternative as “context-specific, non-categorical, expertise-
driven, and infused by a common-law sensibility”). 
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injury, and crime than do less densely populated rural areas” and that “the 
linkage of handguns to firearms deaths and injuries appears to be much 
stronger in urban than in rural areas.”205 He argued that “any self-defense 
interest at the time of the framing could not have focused exclusively upon 
urban-crime-related dangers.”206 Though other elements of Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion seem to have prevailed in the approaches actually used by 
lower courts,207 his emphasis on urban problems has not. This Section argues 
that it can and should. 
Justice Breyer’s effort to take account of how well a gun control law serves 
particular government interests can be thought of as a “balancing” test,208 and 
is essentially a form of means-end scrutiny. The traditional tiers of scrutiny all 
involve some degree of interest-balancing,209 as does the “reasonable 
regulation” test that state courts have overwhelmingly applied to state-level 
constitutional guarantees of the right to keep and bear arms.210 Such an 
approach incorporates some degree of deference to legislatures, which, as 
Justice Breyer put it, “have primary responsibility for drawing policy 
conclusions from empirical fact.”211 
It is easy to see how the pragmatic-balancing approach could incorporate 
the urban/rural divide. As noted above,212 the costs of gun violence and the 
government interest in preventing it are generally higher in urban areas than in 
rural areas.213 This is partly the result of poverty, gangs, and the “ecology of 
 
205.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 698-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
206.  Id. at 715. 
207.  See generally Rostron, supra note 21 (arguing that lower courts have adopted Justice Breyer’s 
focus on contemporary public policy interests rather than the Heller majority’s focus on 
historical-categorical analysis). 
208.  See generally Blocher, supra note 14 (describing the distinction in Heller as being between 
categoricalism and balancing). 
209.  See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (contrasting Heller’s test “of text, history, and tradition” with 
intermediate and strict scrutiny). 
210.  Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 686 (2007) (“The 
courts of every state to consider the question apply a deferential ‘reasonable regulation’ 
standard in arms rights cases.”). 
211.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
212.  See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text. 
213.  Cf. Kairys, supra note 124, at 196 (“The large urban areas of the nation, where unregulated 
handgun markets have taken such a terrible toll, should have the power to regulate 
handguns within their borders.”). 
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violence” they create.214 Other unavoidable characteristics of urban life—higher 
population density, for example—increase gun-related risks. Stray bullets are 
more likely to hit a bystander where there are more bystanders to hit. Indeed, 
proximity to individuals acquiring firearms is inversely correlated with feelings 
of safety,215 and densely populated urban areas obviously involve greater 
proximity to other people, including those acquiring firearms. Whatever the 
root causes of urban gun violence, gun control is more likely to be 
constitutional in cities than in rural areas, since the problems it addresses are 
especially prevalent in the former. 
One might say in response that the balancing approach requires (and 
perhaps permits) no local tailoring for the simple reason that the approach 
itself will capture any relevant geographic variations. If a particular urban area 
faces a genuine problem with gun violence and can demonstrate the strength of 
its interest in gun control, then the test will take account of that without giving 
any separate weight to the jurisdiction’s urban-ness. Indeed, urban tailoring 
might often be the result of balancing rather than a component of it. But 
balancing need not be entirely ad hoc; balancers often develop and employ 
heuristics to reflect the wisdom of prior balancing.216 The city limits can be one 
such guide. 
The distinction between historical categoricalism and pragmatic balancing 
should not be overstated—in practice, the two approaches seem to have merged 
in various ways.217 As Allen Rostron notes, “Without clear or complete 
 
214.  Fagan & Wilkinson, supra note 101, at 106-07. 
215.  David Hemenway, Sara J. Solnick & Deborah R. Azrael, Firearms and Community Feelings of 
Safety, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 121, 124 (1995) (“For the entire population—gun 
owners and non-gun owners together—71% feel less safe and 19% feel more safe when 
others in the community acquire firearms.”). When only gun owners are asked, the 
numbers of respondents feeling safer and less safe are roughly equal. Id.; see also Guns, 
GALLUP, Nov. 19-21, 2004, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/Guns.aspx (last visited Sept. 
16, 2013) (reporting that 65% of respondents would feel “less safe” if concealed weapons 
were allowed “in a public place such as a restaurant or movie theater”). 
216.  Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (“[I]n 
every case where we are called upon to balance the interest in free expression against other 
interests, it seems to me important that we should keep in the forefront the question of 
whether those other interests are state or federal. Since under our constitutional scheme the 
two are not necessarily equivalent, the balancing process must needs often produce different 
results.”). 
217.  The two-stage analysis adopted by many courts of appeals, for example, combines an initial 
categorical inquiry with balancing-heavy intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. 
Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 
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guidance from the Supreme Court, lower court judges have proposed an array 
of different approaches and formulations, producing a ‘morass of conflicting 
lower court opinions’ regarding the proper analysis to apply.”218 There seems 
to be general agreement that “historical meaning enjoys a privileged 
interpretative role in the Second Amendment context.”219 But precisely what 
that role should be is a matter of more robust debate.220 For example, one 
might conclude that the historical tradition of gun control suggests the 
constitutional relevance of an urban/rural distinction, and that the pragmatic 
balancing approach provides a mechanism with which to apply it. 
i i i .  constitutional and statutory localism 
The arguments thus far have been largely internal to the Second 
Amendment. But firearm localism has implications for—and draws support 
from—broader developments and arguments in constitutional law. It also 
provides strong historical and normative support for the revision or repeal of 
strict state laws preempting local gun regulation. Such laws not only represent 
a break from our longstanding tradition of firearm localism, they unnecessarily 
prevent urban areas from addressing their unique problems of gun violence. 
This final Part considers both the federal constitutional backdrop and the state 
statutory foreground. 
 
F.3d 1244, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701-04 (7th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 
627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 
2010). For a thoughtful scholarly effort along these lines, see Miller, supra note 133. 
218.  Rostron, supra note 21, at 706 (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 688-89 (Davis, J., concurring in 
the judgment)). 
219.  United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011). 
220.  Compare Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1259 (concluding that while longstanding forms of gun 
control are entitled to some presumption of validity, courts should also apply intermediate 
scrutiny and look for “meaningful evidence” supporting any given law), with id. at 1271 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that Heller required courts to evaluate gun control 
“based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate 
scrutiny”). 
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A.  Localism and Constitutional Rights 
It is often said that incorporated constitutional rights apply identically to all 
levels of government.221 In McDonald itself, the Court rejected the argument 
that state gun regulations might be subject to a more forgiving standard of 
scrutiny,222 concluding that its jurisprudence “decisively” creates a “well-
established rule that incorporated Bill of Rights protections apply identically to 
the States and the Federal Government.”223 But despite the frequency with 
which it is invoked, the supposed rule of uniformity is neither universally 
applicable nor universally desirable. For all the reasons discussed above, the 
Second Amendment presents a particularly strong case for advocates of 
constitutional localism, and simultaneously draws strength from that broader 
framework. 
Mark Rosen has provided perhaps the most extensive support for the 
argument that “geographic nonuniformity of constitutional requirements and 
proscriptions is a mainstay of American constitutionalism.”224 He notes that 
“constitutional rights are defined in part on the basis of community 
expectations and considerations”225 and that “[t]he most fundamental lesson is 
that courts already possess doctrinal tools for accommodating idiosyncratic but 
valuable communities.”226 Perhaps the most prominent doctrinal example—
which, as explained below, may have particular salience for the Second 
Amendment227—is the First Amendment’s treatment of obscenity. Under 
longstanding free speech doctrine, obscene materials are said to fall outside the 
boundaries of constitutional protection.228 The definition of obscenity, 
 
221.  E.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Once it is decided that a particular Bill 
of Rights guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice,’ . . . the same 
constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.”); see also 
Rosen, Tailoring, supra note 27, at 1537 (distinguishing between “selective and 
undifferentiated incorporation” and “selective and differentiated incorporation”). 
222.  130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010). 
223.  Id. at 3035 & n.14. 
224.  Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 27, at 1133; see Rosen, Tailoring, supra note 
27, at 1516. 
225.  Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 27, at 1169. 
226.  Id. at 1166. 
227.  See infra notes 322 and accompanying text. 
228.  This does not necessarily mean that all regulations of obscenity are permissible—among 
other things, the First Amendment may still protect the right to possess obscene materials in 
one’s own home. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). For an influential effort to draw 
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however, incorporates “community standards.”229 And those standards are not 
national, nor even state, but local—a “juror is entitled to draw on his own 
knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or vicinage 
from which he comes.”230 The Court has emphasized that “[i]t is neither 
realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring 
that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct 
found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”231 
Some other federally guaranteed rights manifest themselves differently in 
different places. For example, the “property” protected by the Due Process and 
Takings Clauses is a product of subnational law. Indeed, such constitutionally 
protected entitlements are “‘not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are 
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .’”232 Whether these 
state-created interests “rise[] to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ 
protected by the Due Process Clause” is a question of federal constitutional 
law.233 In Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, for example, the Court 
considered whether a person had a property interest in police enforcement of a 
restraining order against her husband.234 Resolution of that issue, the Court 
recognized, “begins . . . with a determination of what it is that state law 
provides. In the context of the present case, the central state-law question is 
whether Colorado law gave respondent a right to police enforcement of the 
restraining order.”235 The Court concluded that it did not. But in another state, 
with different laws, the federal claim could have prevailed. 
 
connections between obscenity doctrine and the Second Amendment, see Miller, supra note 
133 (cited in McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3105 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
229.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32-33 (1973) (internal citation omitted). 
230.  Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974). 
231.  Miller, 413 U.S. at 32; see also Hoover v. Byrd, 801 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that 
this test “permit[s] differing levels of obscenity regulation in such diverse communities as 
Kerrville and Houston, Texas”). 
232.  Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); see also Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of 
Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 906 (2007) (arguing for local tailoring of 
Takings Clause doctrine). 
233.  Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 
577). 
234.  545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
235.  Id. at 757. 
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Other examples of geographically dependent tailoring incorporate more 
directly the kinds of interest-balancing described in Section I.C. Time, place, 
and manner restrictions, for example, are geographically tailored, and speech 
can also be broadly regulated in particular areas such as schools,236 airports,237 
and military bases,238 which might well be the kinds of locations Justice Scalia 
had in mind when he said that the Second Amendment permits the regulation 
of guns in “sensitive places.”239 
Each of these examples can be explained based on considerations specific to 
the right at issue, but they are also buttressed by strong arguments for localism 
itself—arguments that are not limited to any particular constitutional right. As 
David Barron explains: 
There is a value in ensuring that local jurisdictions have the discretion 
to make the decisions that their residents wish them to make. The value 
inheres in the traditional advantages that attend decentralization. These 
include more participatory and responsive government; more diversity 
of policy experimentation; more flexibility in responding to changing 
circumstances; and more diffusion of governmental power, which in 
turn checks tyranny.240 
These values appeal to a broad audience241 and represent a “striking 
harmonization of the otherwise divergent values of the free market, civic 
republicanism and critical legal studies.”242 The benefits of local expertise can 
be considerable, particularly with regard to issues of public safety243 and where 
 
236.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007) (reaffirming that “the constitutional rights 
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings”) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
237.  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-83 (1992) (finding that 
airports are not public fora). 
238.  Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (finding military bases to be non-public fora). 
239.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626. 
240.  David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 382 (2001). 
241.  E.g., NEWT GINGRICH, TO RENEW AMERICA 9 (1995) (“‘Closer is better’ should be the rule of 
thumb for our decision making; less power in Washington and more back home, our 
consistent theme.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1201 (1992) (“[P]opulism and federalism—liberty and localism—work together.”). 
242.  Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (1990). 
243.  See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 267-68 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding the 
Village of Morton Grove’s handgun ban against a Second Amendment challenge and 
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a community is able to internalize both the costs and the benefits of a particular 
restriction.244 For these reasons and others, many Justices have, at various 
times, specifically endorsed the idea that constitutional rights should apply 
differently to different levels of government.245 
On some level, this can be reconciled with the one-size-fits-all principle 
stated in McDonald. Local tailoring of constitutional rights does not necessarily 
mean creating separate rights, at least not any more than the various rules 
governing speech regulations in public parks,246 military bases,247 and 
schools248 indicate a multiplicity of First Amendment rights. The 
interpretation-construction distinction endorsed by some constitutional 
scholars provides further support for this conclusion. It is premised on the 
notion that there is a difference between the semantic meaning of a 
constitutional provision and the constitutional doctrine constructed to 
implement it.249 On this reading, the meaning of the Second Amendment can 
be consistent throughout the country (a product of interpretation), even as the 
doctrine applying it varies locally (a function of construction). Lawrence 
Solum, a chief proponent of the interpretation-construction distinction, 
 
observing that “[h]ome rule government is based on the theory that local governments are 
in the best position to assess the needs and desires of the community and, thus, can most 
wisely enact legislation addressing local concerns” (footnote omitted)); see also Tracey L. 
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black, White, and Gray: A Reply to Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 258-59 (“[T]he residents of Chicago’s high-crime, minority 
neighborhoods . . . are the citizens entitled to determine whether the . . . law reasonably 
balances liberty and order.”); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated 
Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 198 
(defending the constitutionality of Chicago’s anti-loitering law and other forms of urban 
“law enforcement innovation” created with local support). 
244.  Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & 
POL. 147, 171 (2005) (describing a potential justification for Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), as that “the locality has in a sense ‘internalized’ the costs and benefits of the 
legislation—both those injured and those benefited by the restriction share the same 
political and territorial space” (footnote omitted)). 
245.  Rosen, Tailoring, supra note 28, at 1517 (listing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Holmes, 
Cardozo, Jackson, Harlan, Fortas, Powell, Stewart, Stevens, Blackmun, Ginsburg, Scalia, 
and Thomas). 
246.  Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). 
247.  Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836-38 (1976). 
248.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007). 
249.  See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95 (2010); Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 119 (2010). 
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similarly points out that the meaning of the First Amendment says nothing 
about “time, place, and manner” doctrine.250 The latter is a matter of 
construction rather than interpretation, and the restrictions it permits vary 
geographically. 
Just as local tailoring of constitutional doctrine would not necessarily create 
a multiplicity of constitutional meanings, neither would it permit local 
governments to pass whatever gun control they please. Precisely defining the 
range of permissible local variation is impossible, because Second Amendment 
doctrine itself is still in flux, but tailoring would operate only at the margins. 
City-wide handgun bans will almost certainly be found unconstitutional, as 
they were in Heller. And yet gun prohibitions are presumptively permissible in 
“sensitive places” like government buildings and schools—a form of micro-
level local tailoring. Determining where a particular local gun law (a permit 
requirement, for example, or a ban on concealed carrying) falls on this 
spectrum of permissibility will depend on the relevant history, the 
governmental interests involved, and the degree to which private interests are 
burdened. The local nature of the action would simply be an additional factor 
to consider. 
There are, of course, problems with constitutional localism in general, and 
with firearm localism in particular. Section III.C will address the latter. As to 
the former, any kind of localism carries with it the political risks familiar to 
students of federalism. As James Madison noted, “[a]mong the numerous 
advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more 
accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of 
faction.”251 Heather Gerken explains: 
The nationalists’ objection to conventional federalism typically takes 
one of two forms. The first is a worry that local power is a threat to 
minority rights. The second is a related concern about what we might 
loosely analogize to the principal-agent problem—the fear that state 
decisions that fly in the face of deeply held national norms will be 
 
250.  Solum, supra note 249, at 99; see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (approving 
as constitutional “regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are 
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave 
open ample alternative channels of communication” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))). 
251.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke ed., 1961). 
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insulated from reversal. Both find their strongest examples in the tragic 
history of slavery and Jim Crow.252 
That tragic history includes efforts to render African-Americans defenseless by 
denying them the right to keep and bear arms.253 How, in light of that risk, can 
there be any allure in firearm localism? 
Part of the answer lies in the comparative ease with which local decisions 
that “fly in the face” of national or state norms can be reversed. From the 
perspective of the Federal Constitution, cities are creatures of state law, and 
their decisions can generally be overturned at the state level.254 Indeed, state 
preemption laws do exactly this (though, as I argue below,255 they go too far in 
doing so). Moreover, as David Barron notes, “there is little risk that a city will 
remain a scofflaw for long. The fact that cities are not fully sovereign means 
that municipal taxpayers enjoy relaxed standing requirements in suits against 
their cities for disobeying the law.”256 Even holding aside the ability of states or 
litigants to check localized tyranny, “[s]ome have argued, in fact, that local 
political processes are less susceptible to capture by special interests” than larger 
governmental units since it is easier for people to exit local governments.257 As 
Robert Cooter notes, “[t]he ‘exit principle’ implies the ‘federalism of individual 
rights,’ by which I mean that courts should tolerate more interference with 
 
252.  Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (2010) (footnotes omitted); see also Barron, supra note 27, at 2220 
(“[T]he standard view is that the higher up one goes, the less passion and the more reason 
enters into interpretation.”). 
253.  See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 336-38 (1991) (detailing antebellum Southern 
restrictions on African-Americans’ use and ownership of guns); id. at 344-46 (describing 
Southern legislative attempts, as part of the “black codes,” to disarm newly freed slaves by 
forbidding them from carrying firearms without a license). 
254.  See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 201 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907). Nevertheless, the majority of 
states provide “home rule” authority to local municipalities. See Home Rule in the States, 
COMMUNITY ENVTL. LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://www.celdf.org/home-rule-in-the-states (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
255.  See infra Section III.B. 
256.  Barron, supra note 27, at 2234. 
257.  Schragger, supra note 244, at 164 (emphasis added); see Rosen, Tailoring, supra note 27, at 
1610-11. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956) (describing model in which citizen-consumers will move to communities 
whose bundle of government services they prefer). 
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individual liberty when the effects are localized.”258 Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson 
III pointed out in his criticism of Heller that citizens who oppose gun control 
“remain free to move to other localities more protective of gun rights.”259 
And even if such local variation cannot totally be erased by state 
governments, its persistence might not necessarily be a bad thing. As Gerken 
and others have shown, local governments and political minorities who resist 
broader norms can protect minority voices while facilitating broader 
democratic engagement.260 Local experimentation with gun control has 
sometimes been motivated by those very goals. The city council members who 
enacted Washington’s handgun ban “thought the D.C. law would spark a 
nationwide trend to ban all handguns in America—if not all guns period.”261 
Similarly, one of the trustees who voted for Morton Grove’s handgun ban told 
a reporter, “We felt gun control would have to be a grass-roots effort, as with 
child labor and pollution laws, and wanted to send a message to other villages 
and towns that they could enact such ordinances.”262 There is some reason to 
think that this signaling was effective,263 even though it eventually served as a 
greater inspiration to opponents of gun control than to its supporters.264 
Sometimes these urban gun control efforts have inspired broader political 
support. In the late 1990s, for example, the city of Richmond initiated Project 
Exile, which earned the rare simultaneous approval of the NRA and the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. The project brought state and federal 
prosecutors together to maximize the sentences of anyone using a gun to 
 
258.  ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 323 (2000). 
259.  J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 
253, 320 (2009). 
260.  See Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349, 1351 (2013) (arguing 
that the ability of minority polities to act contrary to national will has “unique implications 
for two of the most important projects undergirding much of constitutional theory: 
integrating a diverse polity and encouraging democratic debate”). 
261.  WINKLER, supra note 4, at 18. 
262.  Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., Illinois Town Faces Lawsuit After Limiting Pistol Use, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 4, 1981, at A6. 
263.  REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at 40 n.19 (noting that at least thirteen 
Illinois communities banned handguns, “making Illinois unique among the states in the 
number of local ordinances banning handguns”). 
264.  Goss, supra note 82, at 704 (“Interestingly, the gun rights forces appeared to take the 
political potential of the Chicago-area developments far more seriously than did the gun 
control side.”). 
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commit a crime in the city.265 The success of Project Exile has been debated,266 
but for present purposes what matters most is that it was locally focused but 
nationally prominent. Targeted programs in Kansas City267 inspired similar 
patrols in New York,268 and available data suggests that “stringent regulation 
of concealable weapons played an important role in driving down the rate of 
violent crime” in New York.269 Similarly, the lauded Boston Gun Project 
“included an interagency problem-solving group that sought to disrupt the 
illegal supply of firearms to youth” through various systematic efforts.270 The 
Boston and Richmond programs, in turn, served as models for the Bush 
Administration’s Project Safe Neighborhoods, which encouraged federal-local 
partnerships in combating gun crime.271 These partnerships and policy 
innovations would not have been possible without pioneering local 
governments taking the first step. 
The extent of local tailoring in current constitutional law should not be 
overstated—there is a general presumption in favor of national uniformity, and 
the reasons for diverging from that uniformity are always specific to the right 
involved. Firearm localism would operate at the margins of the right to keep 
and bear arms, and for reasons that are specific to the right itself. Indeed, our 
long national tradition of local variation in gun control demonstrates—even 
before Heller—that prohibitionist gun control is not only constitutionally 
constrained, but politically unlikely.272 The preceding Sections have argued 
that the Second Amendment is particularly well suited for local tailoring. The 
goal of this Section has been to situate that argument in a broader 
constitutional context. 
 
265.  TUSHNET, supra note 123, at 103. 
266.  Id. at 103-10 (describing the debate); Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Pragmatic Gun Policy, in 
EVALUATING GUN POLICY, supra note 87, at 1, 27-28; see also Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, 
Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case of Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY, supra 
note 87, at 251 (finding little evidence of Project Exile’s success). 
267.  TUSHNET, supra note 123, at 106 (describing these programs). 
268.  Cook & Ludwig, supra note 37, at 1336. 
269.  Rosenthal, supra note 93, at 5. 
270.  Braga et al., supra note 59, at 345; see also Hinson, supra note 85, at 873-77 (describing the 
Gun Project, specialized gun court, and other initiatives in Boston). 
271.  Cook & Ludwig, supra note 37, at 1336-37. 
272.  Even before Heller was decided, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and approximately a dozen 
other Illinois communities were apparently among the only jurisdictions in the country with 
handgun bans. See REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at 38-41. 
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B.  Against Preemption 
This Article’s argument is primarily constitutional: that Second 
Amendment doctrine can and should be tailored to better reflect the 
urban/rural divide. As a practical matter, however, the biggest legal obstacles to 
firearm localism are not to be found in the Federal Constitution, but in state 
statutes—specifically, in preemption laws that prohibit or sharply limit local 
gun control. Although these laws do not undermine the constitutional 
argument for firearm localism, they should nonetheless be repealed or revised 
in light of the historical, cultural, and pragmatic case for localism. 
Though local autonomy with regard to gun regulation was the norm 
throughout most of American history,273 the past three decades have seen a 
dramatic change.274 Prompted in part by the passage of a handgun ban in 
Morton Grove, Illinois, in 1981, the NRA and other gun rights organizations 
began pushing for state-level preemption laws that would forbid local 
governments from enacting certain kinds of gun control.275 Though it broke 
with the tradition of local governance described above (and endorsed elsewhere 
by the NRA)276 the preemption campaign was incredibly successful.277 As of 
2002, forty-one states had preempted some or all local gun control,278 thereby 
reducing the stringency, scope, and variety of local gun regulations. As the 
former leader of a national gun control organization put it: “There’s no 
question that the NRA’s effort to pass preemption laws was a serious setback, 
and there’s no question that whatever the implications in terms of policy, what 
you do lose at the local level is the ability to rally people around a local issue  
. . . .”279 
 
273.  Cornell & DeDino, supra note 164, at 516 (“[L]ocal regulation was quite common in pre-
Civil War America.”); see also Badaracco, supra note 127, at 762 (“State and local 
governments have traditionally enjoyed a great deal of latitude in passing gun control laws  
. . . .”). 
274.  Because these laws are so recent, they do not undermine the historical-categorical case for 
localism described in Section II.A. 
275.  See UTTER, supra note 29, at 200. 
276.  Stephen P. Teret et al., Gun Deaths and Home Rule: A Case for Local Regulation of a Local 
Public Health Problem, 9 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 44, 45 (1993) (referencing the NRA’s 
past support for local control (citing INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N. OF 
AM., NRA STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUE BRIEF (1986)). 
277.  Goss, supra note 82, at 706; Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 87, at 363. 
278.  Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 87, at 349. 
279.  Goss, supra note 82, at 706-07. 
 the yale law journal 123:82   2013  
134 
 
State preemption laws have important implications for firearm localism, 
and vice versa. First, by making local gun control laws harder to pass as a 
political matter, and barring many of them as a legal matter, preemption 
statutes narrow the potential scope of this Article’s argument—the less local 
gun control there is, the less relevant firearm localism will be. But the existence 
of these laws does not impact the strength of the Article’s argument in favor of 
constitutional deference to urban gun regulation. Whether that deference is 
justified is not dependent on how often it might be invoked. Indeed, those who 
fear that firearm localism would weaken gun rights might take heart from the 
fact that states can actively check local regulations that go too far.280 
Second, and despite the obstacles presented by preemption laws, firearm 
localism remains enormously significant even under the current legal regime. 
The vast majority of gun control laws are still local,281 and some of those laws 
cover municipalities that are more populous than many states. Moreover, many 
states with preemption laws have specific statutory exceptions for certain kinds 
of gun control.282 And in the eight states with no (or limited) preemption laws, 
local governments are freer to regulate, subject to constitutional constraints. 
These are precisely the states where local gun control is most likely to be passed 
in any event.283 
Third, many of the arguments in favor of preemption laws have been 
substantially mooted. Heller and McDonald constitutionally prohibit the kinds 
of handgun bans and other especially stringent gun control that proponents of 
 
280.  This was precisely the argument that Illinois made in its amicus brief supporting Chicago in 
McDonald. Brief for the States of Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 21, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 
2010 WL 59029, at *21-22; see also Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State 
Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 108 (2011) (discussing the role of state attorneys 
general in gun control litigation). 
281.  See sources cited supra note 87. 
282.  REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at 15; see also David B. Kopel, Limited 
Preemption of Firearms Laws: A Good Step for Civil Rights (Mar. 11, 2003), DAVE KOPEL, 
http://www.davekopel.com/2a/IB/Limited-Preemption.htm (noting that only half of the 
states with preemption laws “totally forbid local gun laws”). 
283.  Cf. O’Shea, supra note 41, at 212 n.52 (“Primary gun culture states tend to have broader 
firearms preemption laws, allowing little leeway for added municipal restrictions, while 
secondary jurisdictions tend to have very limited preemption (Massachusetts, New York) or 
none (Maryland)—although California, with strong preemption, is an exception to the 
pattern.”). 
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preemption laws sought to prevent at the local level.284 Since those laws are 
now unconstitutional, there is no need for preemption laws to prevent them. 
And while it may not be politically realistic to expect, Heller and McDonald 
should give members of the gun culture “less reason to fear creeping 
confiscation.”285 This in turn should lessen the impact of the “slippery-slope 
arguments [that] play a large role in anti-gun-control rhetoric,”286 and permit 
“sensible gun control laws—those aimed at disarming criminals, not ordinary 
citizens—[to] pass much more easily.”287 Moreover, a locally tailored Second 
Amendment doctrine would permit courts to uphold “reasonable firearms 
regulations”288 in cities without diluting the rights of rural residents.289 
Focusing energy on urban areas, where the costs of gun violence and support 
for gun control are highest, might give gun control advocates a shot at 
incremental policy victories that have proven elusive at the state and national 
levels.290 
One might respond that states are still the best political unit to make these 
decisions, and that urban and rural residents should hash out their differences 
in state legislatures. But, for all the reasons discussed in Part I, state-level 
 
284.  See Robert VerBruggen, Self-Defense vs. Municipal Gun Bans, REASON, June 2005, at 40, 44 
(“Local control has nothing to do with denying what I consider a basic right under the state 
and federal constitutions . . . . A village can no more deny self-defense than they can pass an 
ordinance that you can’t publish articles in their territory.” (quoting Illinois State Senator 
Edward Petker)); supra note 272. 
285.  Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Letter to the Editor, REASON, June 1996, at 10 (“If the Supreme 
Court were to interpret the Second Amendment [to protect an individual right to keep and 
bear arms], gun owners would have less reason to fear creeping confiscation . . . .”). 
286.  TUSHNET, supra note 123, at 129; see also Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 
42 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 84-89 (1992) (criticizing the use of slippery slope arguments in the gun 
control debate); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1026, 1033-34 (2003) (describing slippery slope arguments as they relate to gun registration 
and confiscation). 
287.  Reynolds, supra note 285. 
288.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (noting that “[s]tate and local 
experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second 
Amendment” (quoting Brief of The States of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 23, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4378909, at *23)). 
289.  But see O’Shea, supra note 41, at 219 (“Dilution is a real risk . . . .”). 
290.  See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 31-35 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that issue advocates often seek the most accessible level 
of government to push their agenda); GOSS, supra note 29, at 145-75. (describing policy 
“incrementalism”). 
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negotiations are unlikely to achieve a satisfying accommodation.291 As James 
Jacobs puts it, “[t]he idea that gun crime in our inner cities (much of which 
takes place among drug dealers and gang members with significant criminal 
records) will be significantly reduced by taking guns away from ranchers, 
farmers, small town residents and suburbanites is, to say the least, a hard 
sell.”292 The converse is equally true: it is a “hard sell” to tell inner cities that 
they must permit “drug dealer gang members” to possess cheap handguns so 
that ranchers, farmers, and small town residents can have hunting rifles.293 
A complete analysis of state preemption laws would require the weighing 
of policy considerations that are beyond the scope of this Article. Supporters of 
preemption emphasize the difficulty of complying with different local gun 
regulations,294 especially when transporting their firearms from one lawful 
place to another—from home to a shooting range, for example. Opponents of 
preemption respond that such costs of compliance are commonplace and 
unobjectionable, particularly when the relevant rules address local safety 
concerns—rules governing traffic and speed limits, the sale and consumption 
of alcohol, and others that vary widely from one city to the next. Striking a 
proper balance between the values of uniformity and local variation requires a 
nuanced consideration of specific gun regulations. However that balance 
should be struck, today’s broad preemption laws go too far in preventing the 
kind of localized gun control that was the norm for most of American history. 
They should be revised or repealed in order to permit firearm localism, for all 
the same reasons that Second Amendment doctrine should be tailored to  
allow it. 
 
291.  See, e.g., Thomas C. Castellano & Edmund F. McGarrell, The Politics of Law and Order: Case 
Study Evidence for a Conflict Model of the Criminal Law Formation Process, 28 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 304, 311-12 (1991) (describing the stark division between New York City and 
upstate New York). 
292.  James B. Jacobs, What Can We Expect of Gun Control?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 189, 
190 (2007). 
293.  See Teret et al., supra note 276, at 44 (arguing that state gun laws preempting municipal 
ones “represent a step backward for public health”). 
294.  Firearms Preemption Laws, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION, (Dec. 16, 2006), 
http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/fact-sheets/2006/firearms-preemption-laws (“Where 
no uniform state [gun] laws are in place, the result can be a complex patchwork of 
restrictions that change from one local jurisdiction to the next.”). 
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C.  Objections and Answers 
None of the foregoing analysis provides an open-and-shut case for firearm 
localism, even at a broad conceptual level.295 Many potential objections have 
been noted along the way. This final Section attempts to identify and answer a 
few more. 
First, one might object that a Second Amendment doctrine that dilutes the 
rights of city-dwellers—especially those in high-crime areas—would effectively 
deny guns to the very people who need them the most. This objection is hard 
to answer because it is premised on disputed empirical suppositions. For 
although urban gun control might limit the possibilities for armed self-defense, 
one of its primary purposes is to lessen the need for such self-defense. A local 
legislature that passes a particular gun control measure has presumably 
concluded that the measure will save lives, and while that determination is not 
immune to judicial evaluation, it is the kind of empirical determination that 
generally receives deference from the courts.296 This Article takes no position 
on whether cities are better off with or without restrictive gun control. The 
constitutional question is to what degree they even have the option to employ 
it. And the fact that gun control would inevitably limit access to armed self-
defense does not mean it is unconstitutional.297 
 
295.  Cf. Schragger, supra note 27, at 1892 (“Taking local governments seriously does not entail 
blinding oneself to their weaknesses. It simply requires giving some attention to the scale of 
government action and to the fact that local governments and state and federal governments 
are differently situated with respect to their citizens.”). 
296.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 704 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[L]egislators, not judges, have primary responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from 
empirical fact.”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (holding that 
courts must “accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress”) 
(quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)); Caitlin E. Borgmann, 
Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2009) (“It is 
traditionally assumed that the role of ascertaining and evaluating the facts underlying a 
statute belongs to the legislatures.”); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of 
Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1175 (2001) (“The Court is 
unlikely to depart from the traditionalist view that the separation of powers places the 
finding of social facts squarely within the realm of the lawmaking power.”). 
297.  Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms.”). 
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A second objection might be that firearm localism would be very difficult to 
implement in practice. As David Barron notes, “[N]o city or state is an island 
jurisdiction. The ability of each locality to make effective decisions on its own is 
inevitably shaped by its relation to other cities and states . . . and, most 
importantly, by the way the central power structures these relations . . . .”298 
This is powerfully true with regard to guns. In his skeptical account of the 
effectiveness of gun control, James Jacobs notes that “[s]ome communities 
wishing to ban private possession of firearms in public places . . . will find their 
ambition undermined by a neighboring community’s policy of allowing liberal 
access to firearms.”299 Studies have unsurprisingly shown that many guns 
found in areas with restrictive gun control were purchased elsewhere.300 
Of course, evaluating the efficacy of policy matters is traditionally entrusted 
to legislative bodies, not to courts, so the argument that gun control would not 
work is at best a partial argument against its feasibility. Even so, it is worth 
noting some empirical evidence suggesting that local-level gun control can 
make a difference, even in urban jurisdictions surrounded by areas with lax 
gun control. One study concluded that when Washington, D.C., passed its gun 
control law in 1976, homicides and suicides declined by approximately 25%, 
thanks in large part to a decline in firearm killings.301 Though not every effort 
to reduce gun crime will be successful—crime control is and has always been 
imperfect—other studies have also found encouraging results.302 
A third objection lies in the definition of “urban” and “rural.” Those are 
very broad terms, and their precise contours are and will surely remain the 
subject of much debate. The resulting imprecision and decision costs could be a 
reason to avoid relying on them in the first place. How, for example, can 
firearm localism account for the suburbs, which may form independent 
municipalities but do not fit neatly into the division between urban centers and 
rural areas? 
 
298.  Barron, supra note 240, at 378-79. 
299.  JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 224 (2002). 
300.  Braga et al., supra note 59, at 331. 
301.  Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide in the 
District of Columbia, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1615 (1991); see also Bogus, supra note 44, at 457 
(“The D.C. law . . . had a significant and immediate benefit.”); Rosenthal, supra note 93, at 5 
(noting apparent success of concealable weapon regulation in New York City). 
302.  Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY, supra 
note 87, at 217, 220 (“In our judgment the Pittsburgh program provides at least suggestive 
evidence that targeted patrols against illegally carried guns may reduce gun crime.”). 
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This definitional obstacle is not insurmountable. After all, social scientists 
who study urban issues have developed tools to define and guide their craft.303 
In the specific context of gun violence, for example, scholars have looked to 
“the sixty-seven U.S. cities with a population of at least 250,000 people as of 
the 2000 census,”304 or to Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 
which are both defined by the Office of Management and Budget as “a core 
area containing a substantial population nucleus, together with adjacent 
communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with that 
core.”305 Some “suburbs” meet that definition, and they seem to reflect urban 
gun control values more closely than rural ones.306 A 2011 Gallup poll found 
that 43.6% of rural residents reported personally owning a gun, with those 
numbers dropping progressively from 27.7% to 15.9% to 15.6% in towns and 
small cities, suburbs, and large cities, respectively.307 Other studies have found 
that suburbanites more closely resemble city-dwellers than rural residents 
when it comes to gun ownership308 and views on gun control. Gary Kleck, for 
example, notes that suburban residents, along with city-dwellers, are more 
supportive of gun control than their rural counterparts.309 When asked 
whether it was more important to protect the right to own guns or to control 
gun ownership, 63% of rural residents chose the former, compared to only 38% 
of urbanites and 46% of suburbanites.310 This is not to say that the issue is 
clear-cut, however. Another recent article reported: 
 
303.  See, e.g., Colin R. Goodall et al., Computing and Using Rural Versus Urban Measures in 
Statistical Applications, 552 AM. STATISTICIAN 101 (1998). 
304.  Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 87, at 349. 
305.  About Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:// 
www.census.gov/population/metro/about (last updated Feb. 26, 2013). 
306.  Another way around the definitional problem would simply be to count as suburbs only 
those areas that are self-governing. 
307.  Kathryn Ticknor, Gun Ownership and Opinion in the United States, KATHRYN TICKNOR: 
LINGUISTIC INSIGHTS AND ANALYTICS (Apr. 2, 2012), https://blogs.commons.georgetown 
.edu/ket37/files/Gun-Ownership-and-Opinion-in-the-United-States.pdf (noting that 
“[t]hese findings are consistent with trends since the 1970s”). 
308.  Another recent poll similarly found that 42% of suburban residents own guns, compared to 
60% in rural areas and 30% in cities. Silver, supra note 59. Though they reflect a suburban-
rural disparity as well, these numbers are somewhat higher than those in the General Social 
Survey. See Tavernise & Gebeloff, supra note 57. 
309.  Kleck, supra note 78, at 401; see also Smith, supra note 75, at 303 (“As one moves from the 
countryside, through the small towns, and on to the metropolitan centers, opposition to gun 
control steadily falls.”). 
310.  Ticknor, supra note 307. 
 the yale law journal 123:82   2013  
140 
 
As with so many American campaigns these days, the real fight is for 
the suburbs. Urban dwellers strongly prioritized gun control, 62 
percent to 34 percent. Rural residents were aligned with gun rights, 64 
percent to 33 percent. In the battleground suburbs, gun control was 
ranked more important by a thin plurality, 48 percent to 45 percent.311 
Firearm localism would not resolve the fight in these battlegrounds. It would, 
however, enable a more direct focus on it, rather than treating cities, suburbs, 
and rural areas as identical. 
Finally, one might argue that, even if rural and urban can be defined with 
the requisite precision, these categories do not capture the underlying 
geographic realities well enough. Even within a city, gun violence might be 
concentrated in a few particular neighborhoods. It would seem that they, not 
the city as a whole, should be the focus of the argument for increased gun 
control deference—firearm localism all the way down, as it were.312 Indeed, 
part of the effort here is to identify a geographic unit between “sensitive places” 
like schools or government buildings313 and larger governance units like the 
state. But as a legal matter, the authority for enacting local gun control 
resides—if it is not preempted by state law—at the level of the municipality, 
not the neighborhood, which makes the former the appropriate level of 
analysis. 
conclusion: directions for second amendment localism 
This Article has argued that Second Amendment doctrine can and should 
incorporate our long national tradition of locally tailored gun control. 
Translating that general principle into specific constitutional rules is another 
matter. In conclusion, however, it may be useful to consider how firearm 
localism would influence ongoing debates regarding assault weapons and 
concealed carrying. The purpose of the following is to show how a localized 
Second Amendment might allow us to ask these questions, not to demonstrate 
 
311.  Shane Goldmacher, Poll Finds That Obama’s Base Overlaps with Gun-Control Coalition, 
NAT’L J., Jan. 14, 2013, http://mobile.nationaljournal.com/daily/poll-finds-that-obama 
-s-base-overlaps-with-gun-control-coalition-20130114 (reporting results of United 
Technologies/National Journal Congressional Connection Poll). 
312.  Cf. Gerken, supra note 252 (describing “federalism all the way down”). 
313.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 & n.26 (2008) (suggesting that 
regulation in such places is “presumptively lawful”). 
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how it would answer them. The latter would, as the discussion shows, require 
further research. 
On December 14, 2012, twenty-six people—twenty of them first-graders—
were murdered at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, 
by a young man with an assault rifle.314 The subsequent debate about gun 
control demonstrated the depth of the cultural divide described in Part I of this 
Article. The NRA, the gun culture’s most prominent and powerful voice, 
argued that arming teachers would help prevent gun violence in schools.315 
Meanwhile, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg—perhaps the most 
prominent spokesman for urban gun control culture—demanded new 
restrictions, saying, “If this moment passes into memory without action from 
Washington, it will be a stain upon our nation . . . .”316 
The most commonly discussed policy solutions have been bans on high-
capacity magazines and “assault weapons” such as AR-15s, which were used at 
Newtown and in other mass murders like the Aurora movie theater and 
Beltway Sniper killings.317 But the federal assault weapons ban was allowed to 
 
314.  James Barron, Nation Reels After Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/nyregion/shooting-reported-at 
-connecticut-elementary-school.html. 
315.  NRA Calls for Armed Police in Every School, FOX NATION, Dec. 21, 2012, 
http://nation.foxnews.com/nra/2012/21/nra-calls-armed-police-ever-school; see also Mariano 
Castillo, NRA Clear on Gun Debate Stance: Arm Schools, CNN, Dec. 21, 2012, http:// 
www.cnn.com/2012/12/21/US/Connecticut-school-shooting.  
316.  Elise Foley, Michael Bloomberg: Failing to Enact Gun Control ‘Will Be a Stain Upon Our 
Nation,’ HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 17, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/17 
/michael-bloomberg-gun-control_n_2316855.html. Speaking on NBC’s Meet the Press, David 
Brooks explicitly noted that “I admire Mayor Bloomberg enormously . . . but it’s 
counterproductive to have him as the spokesperson for the gun law movement. There has to 
be more respect and more people, frankly, from rural and red America who are participants 
in this.” Noah Rothman, David Brooks Slams ‘Counterproductive’ Mayor Bloomberg in ‘Urban 
vs. Rural’ Gun Debate, MEDIAITE, Dec. 16, 2012, http://www.mediaite.com/tv/david-brooks 
-slams-counterproductive-mayor-bloomberg-in-urban-vs-rural-gun-debate. 
317.  See, e.g., Scott Wilson & Philip Rucker, Obama Calls on Congress to Ban 
Assault Weapons, High-Capacity Magazines, WASH. POST, Dec. 19,  
2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-19/politics/35929574_1_assault-weapons 
-president-obama-high-capacity-magazines; George Zornick, How Walmart Helped Make the 
Newtown Shooter’s AR-15 the Most Popular Assault Weapon in America, NATION, Jan. 
7, 2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/171808/how-walmart-helped-make-newtown 
-shooters-ar-15-most-popular-assault-weapon-america (noting that the AR-15 was used in 
all three sets of murders). 
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expire in 2004 despite broad support,318 and it seems unlikely that Congress 
will pass another one any time soon.319 Even with the limitations imposed by 
preemption laws, local action may be the most realistic immediate option for 
gun control advocates. 
How would a localized Second Amendment evaluate the constitutionality 
of an urban ban on assault weapons or high-capacity magazines? The answer 
likely lies in one of Heller’s underexplored exceptions to Second Amendment 
coverage. As noted above, the Court held that “the Second Amendment does 
not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes,”320 but did little to explain what kinds of weapons fit within 
that category.321 A localized Second Amendment would define the term based 
on local standards, allowing increased scope for regulation in places—cities, 
most prominently—where particular types of guns might be considered more 
uncommon, dangerous, or unusual. 
This could happen in at least two ways. First, the Second Amendment 
might take a page from First Amendment doctrine and use local “community 
standards”322 to determine whether a particular weapon is dangerous, unusual, 
or in common use. It would follow that if assault weapons are more 
uncommon, dangerous, and unusual in cities, then those cities should have 
more authority than rural areas to ban them. This inquiry would essentially 
track the pragmatic-balancing approach, at least to the degree that it would 
incorporate contemporary empirical evidence. It would also be influenced by 
 
318.  See REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at 19. 
319.  Sahil Kapur, Assault Weapons Ban Sidelined in the Senate, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Mar.  
19, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://livewire.talkingpointsmemo.com/entry/assault-weapons-ban 
-sidelined-in-senate; see Dan Friedman, Gun Control Efforts Set Back as Senate Democrats 
Abandon Background Check Measure, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1, 2013, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/senate-democrats-abandon-background-check 
-measure-article-1.1415414. 
320.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008); see Volokh, supra note 32, at 1478-83 
(describing and criticizing some of these tests for the scope of Second Amendment 
coverage). 
321.  Justice Scalia suggested at oral argument that machine guns meet the definition. See 
Rostron, supra note 21, at 711 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290)). Yet there are nearly half a million of 
them registered with the federal government. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & 
EXPLOSIVES, FIREARMS COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL STATISTICAL UPDATE 
2012, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE 14, http://www.atf.gov/files/publications/firearms/050412 
-firearms-commerce-in-the-us-annual-statistical-update-2012.pdf. 
322.  See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974). 
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historical traditions of regulation, however, because one of the major 
determinants of a gun’s commonality within a jurisdiction is the degree to 
which it has been regulated in the past. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find 
accurate statistics regarding the relative prevalence of assault weapons in cities 
and rural areas, so it is impossible to say with any confidence whether firearm 
localism would support deference for urban assault weapons bans.323 But if the 
rates of assault weapon ownership are consistent with those of other guns, they 
are probably much less common in cities. If so, a localized approach to the 
Second Amendment would give special support to urban assault weapons bans. 
A second way for Second Amendment doctrine to take account of local 
variation with regard to “dangerous and unusual” weapons would be to look 
directly to local law, rather than to extra-legal community standards. This 
would be akin to the way that Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine do 
not themselves create “property,” but rather incorporate background sources 
such as subnational law.324 Local laws could likewise be used as a guide to what 
guns are dangerous and unusual for constitutional purposes. This approach 
would be consistent with the historical-categorical approach, especially if it 
were to give extra weight to “longstanding” local laws. 
As noted above, the search for evidence is skewed by the fact that most 
states preempt some or all local gun control; many cities therefore do not have 
the power to ban assault weapons. But some do have that authority, and 
exercise it. One recent study examined gun control in ten major cities located in 
states without stringent preemption laws.325 Five of those cities (Boston, 
Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, and New York City) ban or heavily regulate 
assault weapons, while another four are located in states that ban assault 
weapons (Newark, Hartford, Los Angeles, and San Francisco).326 Five ban 
 
323.  Having a more accurate and detailed census of guns would also make it easier to determine 
whether America’s gun cultures are divided not only geographically but with regard to types 
of guns. Perhaps members of gun culture not only own guns at a higher rate, but also 
disproportionately favor certain kinds of weapons—those designed for hunting, for 
example, or self-defense. Or maybe instead the types of high-powered, self-loading rifles 
favored by some hunters are significantly different from the kinds of guns targeted by 
“assault weapons” bans, which would suggest that perhaps the cultural divide is not as 
broad as it seems. 
324.  See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests, of 
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law. . . .”). 
325.  See REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA, supra note 44. 
326.  Id. at 259. Omaha, Nebraska, was the exception. 
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large-capacity ammunition magazines (Boston, Chicago, Columbus, New York 
City, and Los Angeles), and two more (Newark and San Francisco) are located 
in states that do.327 Again, this is imperfect evidence. But it suggests that urban 
bans on assault weapons or high-capacity magazines might have a particularly 
strong claim to constitutionality. 
Bans on concealed carrying have traditionally been considered 
constitutional,328 and they seem to have been particularly common in cities.329 
Like the gunpowder restrictions, concealed carry laws were often tailored to 
heavily populated areas, either in the state laws giving cities and towns the 
power to restrict concealed carrying (and, sometimes, carrying of any kind),330 
or directly in the acts incorporating municipalities.331 As Saul Cornell explains, 
 
327.  Id. 
328.  See Volokh, supra note 32, at 1523 (“For over 150 years, the right to bear arms has generally 
been seen as limited in its scope to exclude concealed carry.”); see also Aymette v. State, 21 
Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840) (upholding Tennessee’s ban on concealed weapons). 
329.  ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 127, at 131 (“State and local attempts to regulate the 
carrying of concealed weapons date from the early nineteenth century, with substantial 
legislative activity occurring during the period from 1880 through 1915.”); see, e.g., An Act to 
Prevent the Carrying of Concealed Deadly Weapons in the Cities and Towns of this 
Territory, § 1, 1862 Colo. Sess. Laws 56 (“If any person or persons shall, within any city, 
town, or village in this Territory . . . carry concealed upon his or her person any pistol . . . or 
other deadly weapon, shall, on conviction . . . be fined . . . .”); An Act to Establish the 
Municipality of Jacksonville Provide for its Government and Prescribe Its Jurisdiction and 
Powers, ch. 3775, § 4, 1887 Fla. Laws 160, 164-65 (“The Mayor and City Council shall within 
the limitations of this act have power by ordinance . . . to regulate and license the sale of 
firearms and suppress the carrying of concealed weapons . . . .”); An Act to Prevent the 
Carrying of Concealed Deadly Weapons in the Cities and Towns of this Territory, § 1, 1864 
Mont. Laws 355 (“If any person shall within any city, town, or village in this Territory . . . 
carry concealed upon his or her person any pistol . . . or other deadly weapon . . . shall, on 
conviction . . . be fined . . . .”). 
330.  See supra note 198. 
331.  See, e.g., An Act to Add an Additional Section to Article Two of the Code of Public Local 
Laws, entitled “Anne Arundel County,” sub-title “Annapolis,” to Prevent the Carrying of 
Concealed Weapons in Said City, ch. 42, § 246, 1872 Md. Laws 56, 57 (“It shall not be lawful 
for any person to carry concealed, in Annapolis . . . any pistol, dirk-knife, bowie-knife, sling-
shot, billy, razor, brass, iron or other metal knuckles, or any other deadly weapon . . . .”); An 
Act to Revise the Charter of the City of Buffalo, ch. 105 § 209, 1891 N.Y. Laws 176, 177 (“No 
person other than members of the police force, regularly elected constables, the sheriff of 
Erie county, and his duly appointed deputies, shall, in the city, carry concealed upon or 
about his person, any pistol or revolver, or other dangerous weapon or weapons, without 
having first obtained a permit, as hereinbefore provided . . . .”); An Act to Revise, 
Consolidate and Amend the Charter of the City of Oshkosh, the Act Incorporating the City, 
and the Several Acts Amendatory Thereof, ch. 183, ch. VI, § 3, pt. 56, 1883 Wis. Sess. Laws 
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regulations of concealed carrying were the natural descendants of the urban 
gunpowder regulations discussed above: 
The first laws banning concealed weapons enacted in the period 
between 1813 and 1859 were essentially time, place, and manner 
restrictions. . . . Prohibitions on the practice of carrying concealed 
weapons were little different than laws that established rules about the 
storage of gunpowder, restricted hunting, or prohibited the discharge 
of weapons in certain areas.332 
Many of these laws were upheld in the face of constitutional challenge, 
providing unusually good evidence that, as the Supreme Court put it in 1897, 
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms is not infringed by laws 
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.”333 Even though Heller seemed 
to reaffirm that holding,334 the constitutionality of concealed carry restrictions 
has been one of the primary Second Amendment battlefronts in recent years.335 
Firearm localism suggests that whenever those cases involve municipal 
restrictions, extra deference is due. The same might be true of other restrictions 
on public carrying. In Moore v. Madigan,336 the Seventh Circuit struck down 
 
687, 713 (allowing the common council “[t]o regulate or prohibit the carrying or wearing by 
any person under his clothes, or concealed about his person, of any pistol or colt, or slung 
shot, or cross knuckles, or knuckles of lead, brass or other metal, or bowie knife, dirk knife, 
or dirk or dagger, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon; and to provide for the 
confiscation or sale of such weapon”); An Act to Prevent the Carrying of Fire Arms and 
Other Deadly Weapons, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. Sess. Laws 352 (“[H]ereafter it shall be 
unlawful for any resident of any city, town or village, or for any one not a resident of any 
city, town or village, in said Territory, but a sojourner therein, to bear upon his person, 
concealed or openly, any fire arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town 
or village.”). 
332.  CORNELL, supra note 164, at 142. 
333.  Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897) (citations omitted). 
334.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[T]he majority of the 19th-
century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed 
weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”). 
335.  See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (“In light of our nation’s 
extensive practice of restricting citizens’ freedom to carry firearms in a concealed manner, 
we hold that this activity does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment’s 
protections.”); see also David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 99, 126 (“In the nineteenth century, concealed carry was often 
considered outside the scope of the right to bear arms. Today, it is the most common way in 
which people exercise their right to bear arms.”). 
336.  702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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Illinois’s statewide ban on public carrying. In doing so, the Court emphasized 
that the Illinois law was unique,337 and that it curtailed “the gun rights of the 
entire law-abiding adult population of Illinois.”338 But what if the law had only 
applied to a particular city,339 or even a part thereof? The historical record, not 
to mention the cost-benefit analysis, might look significantly different if it 
focused on the constitutionality of an urban ban.340 This would not necessarily 
mean that a city could outright prohibit both concealed and open carrying—to 
do so would effectively limit the Second Amendment to the home341—but it 
would give additional deference to “good cause” requirements in urban 
areas.342 In this and other ways, the Second Amendment can preserve our 
longstanding and sensible tradition of firearm localism. 
 
337.  Id. at 940. 
338.  Id. at 942 (describing the burden necessary to justify the “uniquely sweeping ban”). 
339.  Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1202 (noting that the Denver Revised Municipal Code largely prohibits 
unlicensed public carrying at any time). 
340.  See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 705 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The City points to a number 
of founding-era, antebellum, and Reconstruction state and local laws that limited discharge 
of firearms in urban environments.”); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and 
Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1361 (2009) (“In some American 
jurisdictions today, for example, openly carrying a firearm might plausibly be thought to 
violate the ancient common law prohibition against ‘terrifying the good people of the land’ 
by going about with dangerous and unusual weapons.” (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 
COMMENTARIES *148)). 
341.  Lund, supra note 340, at 1361-62 (“If courts were to conclude that open carry violates this 
common law prohibition (and thus is not within the preexisting right protected by the 
Second Amendment), after Heller has decreed that bans on concealed carry are per se valid, 
the constitutional right to bear arms would effectively cease to exist.”). 
342.  Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding a “proper cause” 
requirement for public carrying of handguns). 
